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ABSTRACT
This Article provides valuable insight to the broader discussion
of reforming investor-state disputes. Many have noted that the system is
in a crisis due to a lack of democratic accountability and inconsistent
decisions, which create a chilling effect on legitimate domestic law and
policy. Despite substantial discussion in recent years concerning how to
reform investor-state disputes, there is only limited discussion
concerning the extent to which such disputes challenge domestic
intellectual property (IP) limits, as well as global IP norms. Moreover,
even among those who recognize the challenge to IP limits, the relevance
of human rights is generally not addressed. This Article begins to fill
this gap from two angles. First, it aims to promote a better
understanding of how such disputes undermine the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at an
important time when policymakers are recommending reliance on policy
space under TRIPS. Second, it considers whether human rights might
help to protect this policy space using the facts of Eli Lilly v. Canada.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes that permit a company to challenge a nation's laws as
violating its investments and seek compensation, so-called "investor-
state disputes," pose a major threat to intellectual property (IP) norms.'
Although there are only a few known disputes so far, such as Philip
Morris' challenge to Australia's plain package tobacco laws and Eli
Lilly's challenge to Canada's patent invalidations, investor-state
disputes have important implications.2 Some commentators have
1. This Article recognizes that the entire system of investor-state disputes is at a critical
conjuncture as nations are considering whether to maintain the existing system, reform its
mechanism in major ways, or even potentially jettison the system. See, e.g., Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law, Rep. on the Work of its Fiftieth Session, ¶ 264, U.N. Doc A/72/17 (2017) (charging UNCITRAL
with identifying issues with ISDS, considering whether reform is desirable, and if so, to provide
solutions); Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State
Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 410-11 (2018) (explaining the three possibilities). Regardless
of which path results, the focus of this Article on the evaluation of TRIPS flexibilities outside of
the WTO remain pertinent and can thus inform and complement any future reform.
2. There are only a few known notices to initiate investor-state disputes that limit IP
rights. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration, ¶
85 (Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl582.pdf [https://perma.cc/43UJ-
YFPX]; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 1.1 (Nov.
21, 2011) [hereinafter Philip Morris Asia Ltd., Notice of Arbitration],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0665.pdf [https://perma.cc/KNM7-
7CA4]; Philip Morris Brands Sirlv. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request
for Arbitration, ¶ 1.1 (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Philip Morris, Request for Arbitration],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0343.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UXK-
RRTV]. The PM v. Australia suit challenges a popular domestic regulation of tobacco that requires
cigarettes to be sold in dark drab brown (i.e., "plain" packaging). See Philip Morris Asia Ltd., Notice
of Arbitration, supra, 1 1.5. Since this dispute was initiated, other countries have enacted similar
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improperly assumed that successful initial state defenses indicate that
domestic IP limits are safe from challenge.3 To the contrary, initial
investor-state disputes actually demonstrate that compliance with an
international IP agreement does not immunize a nation from an
investor-state dispute, which on average costs over USD $4 million
simply to defend.4 In addition, although some might assume companies
would exhibit caution in bringing future disputes given that Philip
Morris and Eli Lilly had to reimburse states some costs, the extent of
caution is likely minimal for multinational companies.5 First, neither
of the two fully litigated disputes were considered frivolous.6 Moreover,
laws. See e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, STANDARDIZED OR PLAIN TOBACCO PACKAGING:
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 1-2 (2018), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/
en/standardized packaging-developments-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6DD-UYC5] (noting
countries that have implemented plain packaging, including both those already in force, as well as
those who have politically committed to doing so).
3. See, e.g., Marina Hodges, Uruguay's Victory over Big Tobacco, AUSTL. INST. INT'L AFF.
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.internationalaffairs.org.aulaustralianoutlook/uruguays-victory-
against-big-tobacco/ [https://perma.cclHML3-CC52] (suggesting that the Uruguay award
"solidifies the role of police powers" and that it will be "referenced ... for years to come," even
though there is no precedent in the field of investor-state disputes); Nathaniel Lipkus, Canada's
NAFTA Victory a Win for Judicial Sovereignty, POL'Y OPTIONS (Apr. 7, 2017)
http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/april-2017/canadas---afta-victory-a-win-for-judicial-
sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/VR2F-7XSP] ("[W]e no longer need to worry that trade tribunals will
become supranational courts of appeal over domestic property law disputes.").
4. See, e.g., David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A
Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 19 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev.,
Working Paper No. 2012/3, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2207366
[https://perma.cc/7RVY-UYRV] (finding that legal and arbitration costs have averaged over USD
$8 million, but the information is incomplete since of 143 publicly available awards, sixty-two
awards provide no information at all about costs); Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell,
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Cost, Duration, Size of Claims All Show Steady Increase, ALLEN &
OVERY (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Investment-Treaty-
Arbitration-cost-duration-and-size-of-claims-all-show-steady-increase.aspx [https:/fperma.cc/
67X5-QTU5] (noting an average cost for respondent states of over USD $4.559 million). In addition,
in some cases, arbitration costs can be significantly above average, with costs in some disputes of
USD $40 to $80 million. See, e.g., DIANA ROSERT, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STAKES
ARE HIGH: A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 8 (2014),
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/stakes-are-high-review-financial-costs-
investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JH4-H6ML].
5. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, ¶ 480
(Mar. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Final Award], https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw8546.pdf [https://perma.cc/94P2-KS23] (requiring reimbursement of 75
percent of Canada's costs); Philip Morris Brands Sarl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 586 (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris, Award],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7417.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP7Q-
BLAJI (requiring reimbursement of USD $7 million). This is consistent with the approach of some
tribunals in requiring the losing party to pay costs. See, e.g., Philip Morris, Award, supra TT 585-
86; see also Micha Btihler, Awarding Costs in International Commercial Arbitration: An Overview,
22 ASA BULL. 249, 259 (2004); Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 791 (2011).
6. Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 5, ¶¶ 455(b), 480; Philip Morris, Award, supra note
5, ¶ 586 (noting that each side raised "weighty arguments" for their respective positions).
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payment of a few million dollars in fees for a single case may represent
a small price for a multinational company seeking to fundamentally
change global norms in its favor.7 This is especially true because
bringing a dispute may influence other countries to change their laws
if such countries cannot afford to defend even a frivolous claim;
accordingly, even an official loss in one dispute could be considered an
overall win.8 In addition, even a company concerned about the possible
need to reimburse costs upon losing may still achieve desirable
outcomes by initiating an investment dispute or merely threatening to
do so; such actions may result in settlements in the company's favor.
Such investment disputes challenge previously recognized
domestic safeguards under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which applies to most countries.9
In particular, because TRIPS is a unique agreement that imposes only
minimum, rather than uniform, patent requirements, it inherently
permits domestic discretion in complying with TRIPS, which includes
what policymakers refer to as TRIPS "flexibilities."10 As the Author has
previously argued, these initial investment disputes can be seen as a
new wave of regime shifting by companies desirous of increasing IP
protection and seeking a more favorable forum." Unlike other domestic
7. See, e.g., Claudio Pauillo, Part III: Uruguay vs. Philip Morris, CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY
(Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/11/15/4036/part-iii-uruguay-vs-philip-
morris [https://perma.cc/AYL2-HDWU]. For example, in 2009, when Philip Morris International
sued Uruguay, the company had revenues of USD $62 billion. Id.
8. See, e.g., Krzysztof J. Pelc, Does the International Investment Regime Induce
Frivolous Litigation? 2-3 (May 10, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2778056 [https://perma.cc/A5H4-MEUG].
9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 1.1, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. All WTO members must currently be in compliance,
although the least-developed countries that continue to be least-developed countries have been
provided another extension from complying with obligations relating to pharmaceutical products,
such as granting patent protection on such products until January 2033, with the possibility of
additional extensions. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Extension of the Transition Period Under article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed
Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc.
IP/C/73 (Nov. 6, 2015). Moreover, TRIPS is already an incursion on domestic policy rights since,
before TRIPS, nations could elect to not provide any IP rights, or, at least have full discretion to
deny patent on some issues, such as drugs. See Access to Medicines, 19 WHO DRUG INFO. 236, 238
(2005), http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/AccesstoMedicineslPP.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K2TB-BPLX. Today, all WTO nations (except least-developed countries) must now provide some
type of patent protection, including for drugs, which obviously impacts the right to health,
including the ability to obtain affordable medicines. See Pharmaceutical Patents and the TRIPS
Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 21, 2006), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-el
pharma atol86_e.htm [https://perma.ccl9UYZ-KYMF].
10. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 1(1); see also infra Section II.A (explaining TRIPS
flexibilities).
11. James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement form
the WTO the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI & TECH. 427, 428-30 (2017). Of
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and international arenas where there are competing actors and
interests to argue against increasing IP protection, there is no similar
safeguard in a forum that tends to rule in favor of wealthy,
multinational corporations. 12 This is particularly problematic given
increasing concern about costs of patented drugs, 13 and after the 2016
United Nations (UN) High Level Panel report recommended that
countries embrace TRIPS flexibilities to provide less IP protection.14
States that follow the UN's recommendation may be in danger of
inviting an investor-state dispute.
Can the consideration of human rights help in this situation?
This question presents an interesting, but unexplored angle that this
Article aims to address. 15 Some have repeatedly argued that human
rights be more fully considered in the context of investor-state disputes
course, this does not mean that companies have abandoned existing domestic and alternative
international forums. Id. at 433. However, ISDS presents advantages to companies over other
international forums, such as the WTO or UN, where they cannot directly participate and also
where there are competing norms to promote public interest. Id. at 470.
12. See PIA EBERHARDT & CECICLIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: How LAw FIRMS,
ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 8 (2012); Gus
Van Harten, Arbitrator Behavior in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 211, 211 (2012). For example, in the domestic realm,
companies that seek more IP rights may be countered by public interest groups advocating lower
cost medicines, or freedom of expression. Similar groups may contest international lawmaking in
forums such as the WTO and WIPO and also be supported by some countries that consider higher
IP protection not to be in their domestic interest. See Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Firms' Strategy
Limits Poorer Nations' Smoking Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013)
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/health/tobacco-industry-tactics-limit-poorer-nations-
smoking-laws.html [https://perma.cc/J9SF-3QPN].
13. E.g., EUR. COMM'N, INNOVATIVE PAYMENT MODELS FOR HIGH-COST INNOVATIVE
MEDICINES: REP. OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON EFFECTIVE WAYS OF INVESTING IN HEALTH (EXPH) 7-
8 (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/healthlexpert-panel/sites/expertpanel/files/docsdir/opinion
innovativemedicines en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT5V-T68F]; Mathias Flume et al., Approaches to
Manage Affordability of High Budget Impact Medicines in Key EU Countries, 6 J. MKT. ACCESS &
HEALTH POLY 1, 1 (2018); Toon van der Gronde et al., Addressing the Challenge of High Priced
Prescription Drugs in the Era of Precision Medicine: A Systematic Review of Drug Life Cycles,
Therapeutic Drug Markets and Regulatory Frameworks, 12 PUB. LIBR. SCI. 1, 2 (2017); Robert
Hart, Drugs Are Too Expensive for the NHS-People Are Paying with Their Lives, GUARDIAN (Dec.
20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/dec/20/drug-giants-hefty-prices-nhs-vital-
medication-pharma-profits [https://perma.cc/2B7L-ZANK].
14. UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-
LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 9 (2016) [hereinafter U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT],
https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00cla3ef761/t/57d9c6ebf5e231b2f02cd3d4/1
473890031320/UNSG+HLP+Report+FINAL+12+Sept+2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6QA-VYQA].
15. I thank the conference organizers for inviting me to speak about a human rights angle
for considering IP in recent trade agreements. Although l am well aware of investor-state disputes
challenging IP and have written several articles in this area, I had not previously considered the
human rights angle. See, e.g., Gathii & Ho, supra note 11; Cynthia Ho, A Collision Course Between
TRIPS flexibilities and Investor-State Proceedings, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395 (2018) [hereinafter
Ho, Collision Course]; Cynthia Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: Corporate Challenges to Domestic
Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERK. TECH. L. J. 213 (2015) [hereinafter Ho, Sovereignty].
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to better promote public interest, even if not in the IP context.16 The
UN has also recommended embracing TRIPS flexibilities to promote the
human right to health. 7 In addition, two recent decisions that permit
human rights counterclaims may signal that tribunals are more open
to considering human rights than in the past, even for agreements that
have no explicit language promoting human rights.18 Accordingly, it
seems reasonable to consider whether greater reliance on human rights
aspects of IP in investor-state disputes would better protect TRIPS
flexibilities. Although human rights arguments have had some success
in limiting patent rights on the domestic level, considering human
rights issues in the context of investor-state disputes is also important
given that most domestic actions may be challenged by investor-state
disputes.19
16. E.g., Henok Gabisa, The Fate of International Human Rights Norms in the Realm of
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs): Has Humanity Become a Collateral Damage?, 48 INT'L LAW.
153, 167 (2014); see also CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR INT'L CO-OPERATION, WHOSE RIGHTS ARE WE
PROTECTING? 1 (2015); LUKE ERIC PETERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES: MAPPING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 7
(2009) (explaining relationship between human rights and investment treaties and offering
recommendations to better promote human rights norms); Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from Within the International Investment Law
Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1107, 1114 (2012) (demonstrating that human rights
considerations have always been part of the investment regime and rarely breach investment
treaties); Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human Rights?,
39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483, 502-21(2011) (providing suggestions for how to better incorporate
human rights norms in the international investment regime, although primarily for future
agreements).
17. U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 9, 27; see also Faisal bin Abdulla
al-Henzab (Chairperson-Rapporteur of Social Forum), Access to Medicines in the Context of the
Right to Health, ¶ 69, U/N/ Doc. A/HRC/29/44 (Feb. 18-20, 2015) (recommending TRIPS
flexibilities be used "to their fullest"); Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health), Rep. on the
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, U.N. Doc. A/61/338, ¶ 47 (Sept. 13, 2006) [hereinafter U.N. Rep. ofRapporteur Hunt, 2006];
Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17 (2005), l 35, E/C.12/GC/1712
(Jan. 2006).
18. See Elena Burova, Jurisdiction of Investment Tribunals over Host States'
Counterclaims: Wind of Change?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/03/06/jurisdiction-of-investment-tribunals-
over-host-states-counterclaims-wind-of-change/ [https://perma.cc/2JMZ-E4S3]; Edward Guntrip,
Urbaser v. Argentina: The Origins of a Host State Human Rights Counterclaim in ICSID
Arbitration, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 10, 2017) https://www.ejiltalk.org/urbaser-v-argentina-the-origins-
of-a-host-state-human-rights-counterclaim-in-icsid-arbitration/ [https://perma.ccP9R7-NGSS].
19. For examples of domestic success in limiting patent rights on the basis of human
rights assertions, see Laurence Helfer, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 117, 136-37 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Justine Pila
eds., 2018) (noting success of human rights assertions against attempts to enforce patents on
HIV/AIDS medication, as well as for mandating provision of patented drugs in a number of
countries); Molly Land, Human Rights Frames in IP Contests, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH
276, 278-81 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2014) (explaining success of human
rights framing with access to medicine challenges in South Africa and Brazil); see also Emmanuel
Kolawole Oke, Incorporating a Right to Health Perspective into the Resolution of Patent Law
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This Article uses the facts of Eli Lilly v. Canada as a thought
experiment to consider whether a broader embrace of human rights
norms might prove helpful to protect TRIPS flexibilities. This is
obviously theoretical since human rights were only briefly alluded to by
amicus and not mentioned in the tribunal award. 20 Although there are
other disputes involving domestic limits to trademark use on tobacco
packaging, the laws at issue in those disputes are more firmly
supported by a right to health generally, as well as compliance with the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.21  In addition, the
challenged countries in those disputes enjoyed broad, popular support
for their measures, which likely does not exist for other IP-related
disputes.22 The facts underlying Eli Lilly, on the other hand, involve a
conflict between rights under an International Investment Agreement
(IIA) that challenge TRIPS norms permitting nations discretion to limit
the scope of patent requirements for which there is no consensus. 23 In
particular, whereas most people agree that tobacco use should not be
Disputes, 15 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 97, 98 (2013) (providing details on the impact of the right to
health in Kenya regarding access to medicine).
20. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Submission of Amicus
Curiae Brief of Dr. Burcu Kilic et al. (Feb. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Brief of Dr. Burcu Kilic
et al.], https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7 11 1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X73E-MSFM] (noting that a decision in the case "has the potential to affect the
operation of patent systems and thereby the public and human rights interests they serve and
effect," without elaboration on what specific human rights were at issue). An unaccepted amicus
brief includes some discussion. See Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Application for Leave to
File Brief by Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan et al., T 15 (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw71l2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MQ45-5AQD] (noting that the case had significant public interest because it had "human rights
considerations" among other factors, but not specifically explaining what human rights
considerations were relevant).
21. Indeed, the Uruguay tribunal characterized the Convention as a treaty "guaranteeing
the human rights to health." Philip Morris, Award, supra note 5, T 304. Of course, the focus of this
Article is the extent to which ISDS intersects with TRIPS flexibilities, even though that is not the
entirety of all lSDS disputes involving IP. For example, an ongoing investor-state dispute involves
IP, but without any challenge to domestic IP rights that relate to TRIPS flexibilities, such that it
has different issues. See, e.g., Bridgestone Licensing Servs. Inc. v. Republic of Pan., ICSID Case
No. ARB/16/34, Decision on Expedited Objections, ¶ 174 (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9453.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WK6R-V85U] (finding jurisdiction to decide dispute based on trademarks and related licenses
counting as investments).
22. As one example of broad public support, the recently concluded CPTPP has a carve
out from investor-state disputes for tobacco. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership art. 29(5), Mar. 8, 2018 [hereinafter CPTPP],
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-
not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-
text/#side#CPTPP [https://perma.cc/3NX5-V6RX] (entering into force on December 30, 2018 for
initial six signatories that includes Canada, Mexico and Japan); see also Becky Freeman, Tobacco
Carve-Out in TPP, BMJ BLOG: TOBACCO CONTROL (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://blogs.bmj.com/tc/2015/10/06/tobacco-carve-out-in-tpp/ [https://perma.cc/YH5L-ZBWF].
23. Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 5, TT 4-6.
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encouraged, there is strident disagreement concerning whether patents
should be easier or harder for companies to obtain, even though
patented drugs still implicate the right to health. 24
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II explains the basics
of investor-state disputes and how this system may limit use of TRIPS
flexibilities. Part III then considers whether a broader embrace of
human rights would help protect TRIPS flexibilities in such disputes.
This Part first explains which human rights would be applicable before
reviewing the Eli Lilly facts and investment claims, and then applies
human rights norms. This Part reveals that embracing human rights
norms is not a panacea. In particular, although some human rights
norms might be consistent with promoting domestic policy space, others
could lend more support to investor claims.2 5 Accordingly, the final Part
considers what next steps should be taken to better protect TRIPS
flexibilities in the context of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides key context to reevaluate the Eli Lilly v.
Canada dispute. This Part first explains ISDS, as well as how it
intersects with TRIPS. Then, this Part explains why current reforms
to ISDS fail to protect TRIPS flexibilities.
A. The Investor-State Dispute System and Its Intersection with TRIPS
Issues
This Section provides an overview of ISDS, as well as its
intersection with TRIPS norms. This section begins with the genesis
24. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 22; see also infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text
(discussing opposing views in UN High Level Panel Report, as well as views of some countries and
the pharmaceutical industry). This is reflected in the fact that TRIPS was a hard-won agreement
and since then, despite efforts of developed countries, there has been no uniform standard of
patentability. Rather, as some developed countries continue to enact higher levels of patent
protection in individual agreements, others are aiming to suggest that there should be more user
rights. See CYNTHIA M. Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 325-53 (2011).
25. Of course, human rights arguments can arguably be protective of TRIPS flexibilities
in some contexts even if they do not influence an actual ruling by an international tribunal. For
example, India raised human rights arguments in the WTO challenging EU actions detaining
generic medicines. This challenge did not result in a WTO ruling, but the European Union settled
the case, such that the human rights could have been relevant. Intervention by India, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (June 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/intervention-by-india- seizure-of-generic-drug-consignments- at-ec-
ports.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S8E-LYK9] (noting concern of UN Special Rapporteur with respect to
seizures and the impact on the right to health). However, since ISDS poses unique threats to
domestic flexibilities due to its chilling effect, and since investors could also embrace human rights
arguments, this Article argues against relying on human rights arguments alone to protect TRIPS
flexibilities.
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for the unique dispute mechanism, followed by its current operation and
criticisms. Then, it explains how investment disputes involving TRIPS
flexibilities present additional problems.
Investor-state disputes were originally intended to provide a
remedy to a unique situation that has no parallel with IP. In particular,
ISDS was adopted in the early 1960s when newly democratic countries
wanted to promote foreign investment and ensure foreign investors that
their investments would be protected; previously, foreign investors
often lacked recourse against improper state action, such as improper
taking of assets.26 Although foreign investors could theoretically bring
claims against nations, those claims failed for a variety of reasons,
including the fact that domestic courts had weak rule of laW 2 7 and that
there was no enforceable international mechanism to protect
investors. 28 Against this backdrop, ISDS developed to permit foreign
companies to bring new types of claims concerning investments before
a tribunal of private arbitrators, rather than a domestic court, to ensure
that companies would have recourse to protect their investments. 29
This system was based upon the pre-existing rules for private
commercial arbitration, rather than judicial systems; in this setting,
confidentiality was considered paramount.30
Although investor-state disputes were originally praised-as the
number of agreements permitting the disputes, the number of claims,
and the amount of awards increased-the system has provoked serious
scrutiny and controversy. 31 Many countries and policymakers are
26. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention
and Alternatives to Arbitration, U.N. Doc. UNCTADDIAE/IA/2009/11, at 3-4 (Jan. 8, 2010);
KENNETH VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE 7, 14, 30
(1992).
27. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 26, at 12. Other issues included sovereign immunity or
courts biased against investors. Id. Given the lack of domestic options, home states used or
threatened to use military force to help companies. Id.
28. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1537 (2005).
Although companies could bring an action before the International Court of Justice, even if the
company obtained a favorable ruling, it was not enforceable against a nation without passage of a
UN Security Council Resolution. Id.
29. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 26, at 2-3.
30. See Avinash Poorooye & Rondn Feehily, Confidentiality and Transparency in
International Commercial Arbitration: Finding the Right Balance, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 275,
277-78 (2017) (noting confidentiality as attractive to disputants); Leon Trakman, Confidentiality
in International Commercial Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT'L 1, 1 (2002) (explaining that international
commercial arbitration prizes confidentiality as a reason to choose arbitration over litigation).
31. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Special Update on Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures, UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/7, at 2 fig. 1 (Nov. 7, 2017)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Special Update]; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Recent
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Updated for the Multilateral Dialogue on
Investment, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3/Rev., at 25 (May 28-29, 2013)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Multilateral Dialogue]. For example, there was only one dispute in 1982,
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concerned that such disputes unduly permit foreign companies to
challenge legitimate domestic policies under a nondemocratic system. 32
In particular, whereas domestic decisionmakers are democratically
elected, their decisions can be effectively nullified by investor-state
tribunalists who are not accountable to anyone. 33 Moreover, the
tribunalists lack independence that most associate with judicial
systems since they are paid by the hour and may also function as
lawyers in investor-state disputes when not serving as tribunalists.34
In addition, unlike many judicial systems, there is traditionally no right
for third parties to participate. 35 There is even a lack of transparency
as to the existence of some disputes. 36 To make matters worse, not only
in contrast with over fifty new cases in 2012, and sixty-nine known cases in 2016. UNCTAD,
Special Update, supra, at 1-2; UNCTAD, Multilateral Dialogue, supra, at 2-3.
32. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, REFORMING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OPTIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD 1-3 (2015); Ho, Sovereignty, supra
note 15, at 220-21; Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment
Regime, OSGOODE HALL L. SCH. (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.osgoode.yorku.calpublic-statement-
international-investment-regime-3 1-august-20 10/ [https://perma.cc/7ZFL-4L53]; Jane Kelsey, The
Crisis of Legitimacy in International Investment Agreements and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, JUD. POWER PROJECT (Jan. 9, 2018), https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/jane-kelsey-
the-crisis-of-legitimacy-in-international-investment-agreements-and-investor-state-dispute-
settlement/ [https://perma.cc/SD7Z-68M8]; Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and
ISDS Reforms; What Are States' Concerns?, EJIL: TALK! (June 5, 2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-what-are-states-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/2W8U-MLZP]. Even the Cato Institute, which usually promotes corporate
interests, has expressed concern about including ISDS in a trade agreement. Daniel J. Ikenson, A
Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, CATO INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-
bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purge-negotiations-investor-state
[https://perma.cc/4KT2-JHJT].
33. See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 12, at 7-9.
34. See NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, LISE JOHNSON & FIONA MARSHALL,
ARBITRATOR INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY: EXAMINING THE DUAL ROLE OF ARBITRATOR AND
COUNSEL 26 (2010), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_arbitrator-independence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QBU-4UKQI; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 4, at 20, 44 (stating that a
majority of arbitrators have served as counsel for investors in other cases, whereas only about 10
percent of arbitrators have acted as counsel for states in other cases).
35. See, e.g., Jeffrey Atik, Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA
Chapter 11 Process, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT
PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 135, 147 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004). However, in light of recent
criticism, there is a trend towards more transparency. For example, for disputes governed by
ICSID, not only may third parties make submissions, but a tribunal can accept third party amicus
submissions even over the objection of parties. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES
(ICSID), ICSID/15, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 117 rule 37(2) (2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/documents/icsiddocs/icsid%20convention%2Oenglish.pdf[https://per
ma.cc/SZW2-C3WP] [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
36. ICSID, which handles about 60 percent of disputes, has been publishing at least legal
conclusions of the tribunal since 2006, even if the parties do not consent to publication of the
award. See ICSID Rules, supra note 35, at 122 rule 48(4); see also Julie Lee, UNCITRAL's Unclear
Transparency Instrument: Fashioning the Form and Application of a Legal Standard Ensuring
Greater Disclosure in Investor-State Arbitrations, 33 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 439, 455 n.26 (2013)
(explaining that new rules are an improvement in mandating publication of awards that reveals
tribunal reasoning). However, that is not true for disputes done under UNCITRAL, which is also
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can final awards and settlements be extraordinarily high, with some
exceeding USD $1 billion,37 but the same facts can result in different
conclusions due to lack of precedential effect. 38 All of these issues
contribute to a chilling effect on domestic actions-especially since the
disputes are very expensive to defend.39 Moreover, the original basis
for ISDS (i.e., a lack of legal recourse for foreign investors), does not
exist with respect to some countries and disputes. For example, since
the United States, Canada, and member states of European Union have
always had robust legal systems, there is no real need to provide an
alternative forum for only foreign companies.
All of these general issues apply to investor-state disputes
challenging domestic limits of IP, but investor state disputes that
challenge domestic limits to IP raise additional issues, as is well
illustrated by Eli Lilly v. Canada. In particular, although the Canadian
judiciary invalidated two Eli Lilly patents pursuant to its own domestic
laws and consistent with TRIPS, Eli Lilly claimed that North American
commonly used. See UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES art. 34(5) (2014), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-
revisedlarb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf [https://perma.cc7XUY-NNFB] (requiring consent of all
parties unless legally obligated by another proceeding); LISE JOHNSON & NATHALIE BERNASCONI-
OSTERWALDER, COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., COMMENTARY, NEW UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES ON TRANSPARENCY: APPLICATION, CONTENT AND NEXT STEPS 7 (2013),
http://ccsi.columbia.edulfiles/2014/04fUNCITRALRules-on Transparency commentaryFINAL.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TD4J-E5KJ] (noting that UNCITRAL rules are more restrictive than other
arbitration rules). Although not applicable to most investment agreements, for investment
disputes pursuant to treaties concluded after April 1, 2014 there is a presumption in favor of
publication of the notice of Arbitration, subject to protection of confidential information. See
UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-
BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION arts. 2-3, 7 (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E3E-
5A7A] (stating that notice of arbitration as well as other documents will be promptly made
available to the public). However, even for the minority of treaties to which this applies, parties
can avoid its application. See id. at 5 (noting that the rules apply unless the parties have agreed
otherwise); JOHNSON & BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra, at 10 (explaining how states can opt
out by expressly doing so in the underlying treaty or by expressly noting that the UNICTRAL 1976
rules apply).
37. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: Amount of Compensation, INV. POL'Y HUB
(Dec. 31, 2017), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByAmounts
[https://perma.cc/CV2R-KRSA] (listing compensation amounts awarded and agreed in settlement,
as well as compensation sought).
38. See, e.g., Leon E. Trakman, The ICS1D Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 603, 642-
43 (2012). For example, several cases against Argentina used different interpretations and reached
differing conclusions regarding the same basic facts even though they had the same President of
the Tribunal. Id.; see also Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration
on a State's Regulatory Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT'L. ARB. 245, 253
(2012) (noting divergent interpretation of comparable factual and legal cases in Lauder v. Czech
Republic and CME v. Czech Republic).
39. See, e.g., Rep. of the Indep. Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable
Int'l Order, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/44, at 6 (2015) (chilling effect of awards on state regulations to
protect the environment, food safety, and access to generic medicine); see also Investment Dispute
Settlement Navigator, supra note 37 (regarding cost of dispute).
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Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) investment chapter entitled it to
compensation of CAD $500 million for these two invalidated patents.40
In other words, compliance with an international IP agreement (i.e.,
TRIPS), still left Canada vulnerable to an investor-state dispute.
Moreover, any argument that Canada's laws are inconsistent with
TRIPS could be addressed by the well-respected World Trade
Organization (WTO) Dispute settlement mechanism; in fact, it was
intended to be the sole forum for resolving TRIPS issues.41 Although
there are occasions where international agreements conflict,
investment agreements do not present a direct conflict with TRIPS, yet
could still disrupt TRIPS norms, such as the ability to use TRIPS
flexibilities. 4 2  In particular, since TRIPS establishes that countries
must grant patents to inventions that meet certain requirements, such
as being "useful," and because TRIPS does not define this, there is
technically no conflict between the stricter definition of utility Canada
desired versus the lower standard that Eli Lilly asserted is proper. 4 3 In
other words, Eli Lilly's investment claims undermine the ability to take
advantage of flexibility under TRIPS to provide less protection 44 since
TRIPS flexibilities inherently permit countries to retain discretion in
defining key patentability terms that lack definition under TRIPS. 45
Moreover, although a single dispute only binds the parties to the
dispute, investor-state disputes have been known to have a chilling
effect on those who are not parties but want to avoid the expense of
40. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 1 85.
41. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 23, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (noting that states should not make their own determination
of violations of WTO agreements).
42. For an example of a conflict, see Harm Schepel, From Conflicts-Rules to Field
Preemption: Achmea and the Relationship Between EU Law and International Investment Law
and Arbitration, EuR. L. BLOG (Mar. 23, 2018), http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/03/23/from-
conflicts-rules-to-field-preemption-achmea-and-the-relationship-between-eu-law-and-
international-investment-law-and-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/2HCV-JHY9] (noting situations
of conflict between international investment law and EU law).
43. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 27(1) n. 5.
44. See, e.g., Press Release, PhRMA, PhRMA Statement on NAFTA Tribunal Decision in
the Eli Lilly Case (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-statement-on-
nafta-tribunal-decision-in-the-eli-lilly-case [https://perma.cc/R49E-Y3EM]. This was apparently
intended by Eli Lilly. See id.; Adam Behsudi, Eli Lilly Sues Canada on Drug Patents, POLITICO
(Sept. 12, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/eli-lilly- sues-canada-over-drug-
patents-096743.html [https://perma.cclD5XF-6M4C] (discussing the view that Lilly intended to
use ISDS to force Canada to modify its patent law).
45. See CHAN PARK ET AL., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, USING LAW TO
ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT, COMPETITION AND
MEDICINES LAW 57 (2013); U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 22; Carlos M.
Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 189, 198-200 (Carlos M. Correa & Abulqawi Yusuf eds., 1998).
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being subject to such a suit. 4 6 Accordingly, the dispute poses a threat
to whether all countries can use TRIPS flexibilities.
B. Current Reforms Fail to Protect TRIPS Flexibilities
This Section explains why current proposals to reform ISDS fail
to protect TRIPS flexibilities. To some extent, this failure is
unsurprising since many IP policymakers are not aware of the tension
between ISDS and TRIPS.47 In addition, ISDS reform tends to focus on
issues that impact all disputes, rather than IP-specific disputes.
Although there are many different proposals for reform, this Section
briefly explains the major reforms that aim to protect domestic
discretion; as will be explained, these reforms are inadequate to protect
TRIPS flexibilities. 48
There are two types of reform underway. 49 One type of reform
involves improving investor-state disputes in new agreements; notably,
these reforms would not impact the thousands of existing agreements
pursuant to which disputes may still be brought.50 The other type of
proposed reform is to essentially replace the current system with a
multilateral system, including an independent investment court with
an appellate mechanism. 51  Although these reforms are largely
separate, each type of reform could include suggestions to limit the
46. See Rep. of the Indep. Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable Int'l
Order, supra note 39, at 6 (noting the compromised regulatory function of States due to the chilling
effect of arbitration awards); see also Rep. of Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of
Cultural Rights), Rep. in the Field of Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/70/279, 1 75 (Aug. 4, 2015)
(noting aggravating "chilling effect" where investor state dispute awards present looming
penalties) [hereinafter U.N. Rep. of Special Rapporteur Shaheed].
47. See Ho, Collision Course, supra note 15, at 415-20.
48. For example, there are reforms aimed at improving transparency, and also preventing
corporate restructuring that while important generally, are far removed from protecting domestic
discretion, including TRIPS flexibilities.
49. Of course, another type of "reform" could be to renegotiate, or even terminate, existing
agreements. The UN has in fact suggested this. See U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion of a
Democratic and Equitable International Order, [ 22, 60, U.N. Doc. A/70/285 (Aug. 5, 2015).
50. This is true for agreements such as the recently concluded Transpacific Partnership,
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and E.U.-Vietnam agreement, as well as the
proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. See Ho, Collision Course, supra note
15, at 413-15; Elsa Sardinha, Towards a New Horizon in Investor-State Dispute Settlement?, 54
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 311, 311, 314 (2016) (noting that CETA provides a new investment court, with
appeal possibility, as well as increased transparency); Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder,
Rethinking Investment-Related Dispute Settlement, INv. TREATY NEWS (May 21, 2015),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/05/2 1/rethinking-investment-related-dispute-settlement/
[https://perma.cc/7GFZ-AGSG] (noting options for improving the existing system).
51. See Press Release, Cecilia Malmstrom, Comm'r of Trade, Eur. Comm'n, Commission
Welcomes Adoption of Negotiating Directives for a Multilateral Investment Court (Mar. 20, 2018),
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/press/index.cfm?id=1819 [https://perma.cc/N7V4-8R3C] (noting
that multilateral investment court initiative aims to replace existing bilateral mechanisms in the
investment treaties concluded by EU member states as well as other countries).
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extent to which investment claims impinge on domestic discretion.
However, a closer look at the actual language in recently concluded and
proposed investment agreements shows there are still problems. In
particular, new language aims to limit the most typical investment
claims (i.e., expropriation and fair and equitable treatment (FET)) with
more explicit criteria. 52  However, as will be explained, these
improvements are inadequate to protect TRIPS norms.
The language intended to limit indirect expropriation claims will
fail to protect TRIPS flexibilities. The language is limited to situations
when nations implement regulatory actions in a non-discriminatory
way to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, including public
health.53 However, as the Eli Lilly dispute highlights, challenged
patent laws may be created by the judiciary, rather than a regulatory
agency, and thus would not seem to fall within the language for
regulatory actions.54 Moreover, there is no consensus on whether laws
that limit patentability of drugs necessarily promote public health.
Although some public health advocates argue this is necessarily true
since fewer patented drugs result in more affordable drugs,5 5 others
counterargue that public health is promoted by generously providing
patent protection to incentivize more research and development.56
52. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 22, annex 9-B (limiting expropriation claims);
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada of the One Part, and the
European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part, Can.-E.U., art. 8.10(2), (4) , Oct. 30,
2016 [hereinafter CETA], https://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-
content/EN/TXT/'?uri=CELEX:22017A0114(01) [https://perma.cc/N57Q-ZE3P] (providing
examples of situations that might violate fair and equitable treatment, as well as factors to take
into consideration); CETA, supra, annex 8-A(2)-(3) (providing details on how to assess
expropriation).
53. See CPTPP, supra note 22, annex 9-B(3)(b) ("Nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by
a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare
circumstances."); CETA, supra note 52, annex 8-A(3) ("[E]xcept in the rare circumstance when the
impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears
manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures ... that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health . . . do not constitute indirect expropriations.").
54. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, T 34 (referring to doctrine as created
by judiciary).
55. This is, of course, a fundamental premise of the UN High Level Panel Report. See U.N.
HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 8.
56. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Minutes of the Meeting
of the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of Nov. 8-9, 2016, ¶¶ 621,
623, 638-39, 649, IP/C/M/83/Add.1 (Jan. 30, 2017) (expressing view of the United States, European
Union, and Switzerland that the UN report could undermine innovation and advocating instead
for strong IP policy). The pharmaceutical industry often asserts that patents and other IP do not
hinder access to medicine. See Mike Masnick, Pharma Officials Insist That There Is 'Zero Evidence'
That Patents Harm Access to Medicine, TECHDIRT (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:45 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20 141104/17103829041/merck-exec-top-pharma-lobbyist-
insists-that-there-is-zero-evidence-that-patents-harm-access-to-medicine.shtml [https://perma.cc/
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Language in recent agreements aiming to limit FET claims is
similarly inadequate for protecting TRIPS norms. Although one recent
agreement admirably attempts to restrict this typically over-expansive
claim by listing criteria to consider, none of those criteria consider
whether a nation is acting consistent with an international
agreement.57 There is notably reference to international laws, but in a
different context. For example, the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) says that violation
of another international agreement is not necessarily a breach of FET.5 8
This suggests that breach of TRIPS would not automatically constitute
an investment claim. However, this does nothing to protect nations in
compliance with TRIPS from an expensive compensation claim based
on FET. Language that aims to cabin FET claims based solely on
investor expectations is also inadequate. In particular, although it is
helpful to have language clarifying that denial of investor expectations
alone is inadequate, new language aimed to cabin previous broad claims
based on such expectations still leaves tribunals with great discretion.
For example, CETA says that a tribunal may consider whether a
specific representation was made to an investor that created a
legitimate expectation that investor relied on to its detriment. 59 Eli
Lilly asserted that an issued patent was a representation that it would
remain valid; even though such a belief is contrary to patent norms, this
FET language would not limit Eli Lilly's claim. 60 In addition, unlike
expropriation claims, there is no general exception clause for any
actions.61
WC63-4T7D]. Instead, they emphasize that patents are essential for not only providing important
drugs, but also for eventual low-cost generics. See HO, supra note 24, at 164 (quoting Fred Hassan,
Chairman & CEO, Schering-Plough Corp., Keynote Address at U.S. Chamber of Commerce 5th
Annual Intellectual Property Summit: Fueling Innovation: To Be Our Best for a Better World)
(Oct. 8, 2008) (noting that generics are the direct result of IP-fueled innovation); Martin J.
Adelman, Chairman, ATRIP, Paper Presented at ATRIP Annual Meeting in Tokyo, Japan:
Compulsory Licensing of Drugs: TRIPS Context 1 (Aug. 4, 2003), http://atrip.org/2003-08-04-
annual-congress-tokyo-japan/ [https://perma.cc/9485-P6CRI ("[W]ithout patents there would be far
fewer drugs around for people to access.").
57. See CETA, supra note 52, art 8.10(2) (noting manifest arbitrariness, denial of justice,
breach of due process, as well as abusive treatment of investors, and targeted discrimination on
manifestly wrongful grounds such as gender or race). In contrast, CPTPP only states that it
includes denial of justice and does not specify other areas. CPTPP, supra note 22, art. 9.6(2)(a).
58. Id. art 9.6(3).
59. CETA, supra note 52, art. 8.10(4).
60. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 1 82 (suggesting that an issued
patent is a contract that is violated by a change in the law invalidating the patent).
61. Compare CETA, supra note 52, art. 8.12(5) (excluding some issues from expropriation)
with CETA, art 8.10 (providing no exception to FET claims).
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III. CAN HUMAN RIGHTS HELP?
Although this Article focuses on examining how human rights
could conceivably impact an investor-state dispute challenging
domestic invalidation of patents, it is first important to lay some
foundation. In particular, this Part first briefly considers why it is
valuable to consider human rights in the context of IIAs and then
introduces pertinent human rights that would be relevant to an
investment challenge to domestic laws that limit or revoke IP rights.
This Part then considers how human rights would potentially be used
in an investor-state dispute. After addressing these fundamental
issues, this Part revisits the basic facts and investment claims of Eli
Lilly. Finally, this Part considers how a broader embrace of human
rights might have impacted the ultimate outcome of Eli Lilly's
investment claim.
A. Why Human Rights and Which Ones?
An initial question may be why human rights should be
considered in the context of interpreting IIAs. Human rights are
generally meant to protect the interests of individuals. 62 In contrast,
IIAs aim to protect investments of companies by permitting them to
assert claims against countries.63 However, investment claims may
challenge state obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights
norms.64 In addition, companies can and sometimes have relied on
human rights to support investment claims.65 In addition, since all
62. See LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 3 (2011) (referring to human rights as a system
available to individuals). In the European Union, however, corporations have been found to have
human rights. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 (finding
corporate owned IP to be a property interest protected by human rights); see also Matthew
Happold, Who benefits from Human Rights Treaties?, in LIBER AMICORUM RUSEN ERGEC 117, 117
(Isabelle Riassetto, Luc Heuschling & Georges Ravarani eds., 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3003607 [https://perma.cc/G8Q7-LV8C]
(noting that although human rights are typically limited to individuals, the European Court of
Human Rights and Court of Justice of the European Union have taken a different approach than
the UN, as well as regional and subregional courts).
63. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 U.S MODEL BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY pmbl. (2012) (focusing solely on investments). In contrast, although TRIPS
arguably protects the IP of companies, it at least recognizes competing policy interests between
rights of owners and users. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 7 (noting protection and enforcement of
IP should be "to the mutual advantage of producers and users").
64. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Political Rights (CESCR), General Cmt. No. 14: The Right
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, T 33 (2000) [hereinafter
CESCR General Comment No. 14] (noting right to health imposes three levels of obligations).
65. See LONE WANDAHL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT TO
REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 152 (2016).
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international agreements, including IIAs, are properly interpreted in
accordance with customary international law, the law concerning
human rights norms is relevant.
A fundamental issue is which human rights would be negatively
impacted by investment disputes challenging domestic laws that limit
or revoke IP rights. Relevant human rights include those of individuals
protected under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In particular, under ICESCR, individuals
have a right to health,66 as well as a right to benefit from scientific
progress. 67  The right to benefit from scientific progress exists
concurrently with a right for creators to benefit from their scientific
creations, such that the actual scope of the right to benefit from
scientific progress is somewhat unclear since these competing rights
must be inherently balanced against one another. 68 The scope of the
right to health is more certain, and the UN has repeatedly stated that
the right to health includes a right to access affordable essential
medicine. 69 In addition, although some aspects of the right to health
are subject to progressive realization-meaning that states do not need
to immediately implement certain aspects that are beyond their
practical capabilities-the UN has asserted that states have a core
66. The basis for the human right to health is in the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights, which states "the right of everyone to enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health." International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. However, some
disagree with recognizing health care as a human right. See, e.g., Richard D. Lamm, The Case
Against Making Healthcare a "Right," 25 HuM. RTS. 8, 8-9 (1998) (arguing that it is too costly to
provide all healthcare that is beneficial to every citizen).
67. ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 15.
68. Id. (referring to an individual's right to the "protection of. . . interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author," while also asserting
that all individuals have a human right to "enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications"); see also Educ., Sci., & Cultural Org. (UNESCO), Venice Statement on the Right to
Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications, ¶16, SHS/RSP/HRS-
GED/2009/PI/H/1 (July 16-17, 2009) [hereinafter UNESCO, Venice Statement]; Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. & Political Rights (CESCR), General Cmt. No.17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the
Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic
Production of Which He or She Is the Author, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/1712, ¶¶ 22, 35 (2006) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 17].
Moreover, it has been previously noted that IP is inherently a social product and that states have
an obligation to prevent unreasonably high costs for access to essential medicines. See ISCER,
supra note 66; UNESCO, Venice Statement, supra; CESCR General Comment No. 17, supra.
69. See CESCR General Comment No. 17, supra note 68, ¶ 35 (noting that states have a
duty to prevent unreasonably high costs for essential medicines and a duty to prevent use of
scientific knowledge contrary to human rights, including the right to health, which may include
excluding some inventions form patentability when that would conflict with other human rights);
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 64, ¶ 43(d) (noting that the core obligation to fulfill
the right to health includes providing essential drugs); see also U.N. Rep. of Rapporteur Hunt,
2006, supra note 17, ¶ 47 (recommending use of compulsory licenses to provide affordable drugs).
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obligation to make "essential medicines" available and accessible,
which is not subject to progressive realization. 70
Both the right to health, as well as the right to benefit from
scientific progress, could be undermined by an investor-state dispute.
In particular, a dispute may challenge a nation's use of TRIPS
flexibilities intended to support such rights. After all, a TRIPS
flexibility, such as defining patentability narrowly to ensure some drugs
are not patentable and thus affordable, could promote the right to
health as well as the right for all individuals to benefit from scientific
progress. Thus, if a nation cannot use its TRIPS flexibilities, it may not
be in compliance with its obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill
human rights norms.71 Of course, many states arguably are currently
not in compliance with the right to provide access to affordable medicine
since many still lack such access. 72 An investment dispute, or even the
threat of such a dispute, would likely make the situation worse.
One thorny question is the extent to which there is a human
right to property, especially whether companies have such a right, since
it could also impact an investment dispute. As noted earlier, human
rights are generally focused on the rights of individuals. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaims a right to property.73
The UDHR, however, is not a treaty and has no force of law, although
some may suggest that some of the rights proclaimed by the UDHR now
have status of customary international law. 7 4 In addition, some
regional agreements support a right to property.75 Some scholars argue
70. CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 64, ¶ 43(d) (noting that the core
obligation to fulfill the right to health includes providing essential drugs); U.N. Rep. of Rapporteur
Hunt, 2006, supra note 17, ¶¶ 56-58; Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur), The Right of Everyone to
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, ¶¶ 43-44, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 (Mar. 1, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Rep. of Rapporteur Hunt, 2004].
71. CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 64, ¶ 33 (noting that right to health
imposes three levels of obligations). The right to health includes availability and accessibility of
goods and services that impact health, as well socioeconomic conditions that impact health. See id.
¶¶ 4, 9.
72. See, e.g., MDG GAP TASK FORCE, THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
DEVELOPMENT 53, 58-59, U.N. Sales No. E.14.I.7 (2014). Of course, lack of universal access to
affordable medicine does not mean that progress has not been made. There have been some notable
situations where domestic litigation has improved access. See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 19, at 137;
Land, supra note 19, at 278-81; Oke, supra note 19, at 102-03.
73. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR] (noting the right to own property, and not to be arbitrarily deprived of it).
74. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 62, at 8-9.
75. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention of Human Rights]; American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man art. 23, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 9th Int'l Conference of Am.
States.
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there should be a recognized human right to property.76 Accordingly,
corporate entities may assert a property-based human right interest to
IP they own.77
Another important issue is who has responsibility to promote
human rights. Traditionally, the state is responsible for protecting and
promoting the human rights of individuals. It has also been stated that
all members of society, including the private sector, have
responsibilities regarding the realization of the right to health.78
However, there is no enforceable mechanism to mandate the private
sector do so; although there are current discussions aiming to impose
binding human rights obligations on companies,79 the human right to
health may not be a right for which binding obligations are sought.80
So, companies currently have no obligation to promote or respect
76. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Human Right of Property, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 580, 596
(2018); John G. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 464, 465
(2014) (arguing that it should be considered to exist as a matter of customary law).
77. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42. There
is current controversy concerning the existence of a human right to property, but this does not
mean that it cannot be embraced by companies, nor that investment tribunalists will not find it
persuasive. This is particularly true since the tribunal could rely on precedence from regional
agreements finding a human right to IP for corporations. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal,
App. No. 73049/01, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 42 (finding corporate-owned IP to be property interest
protected by human rights).
78. CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 64, ¶ 42. Although the UN has issued
guidelines for pharmaceutical companies in particular, these are only suggested guidelines. E.g.,
Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical & Mental Health), The Right to Health, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/63/263
(Aug. 11, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Rep. of Rapporteur Hunt, 2000] (using language of "should"); see
also Suerie Moon, Respecting the Right to Access to Medicines: Implications of the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights for the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS. 32, 36-37 (2013) (quoting Gen. Comment No. 14).
79. See Maria Fernanda Espinosa (Chair-Rapporteur), Rep. on the Second Session of the
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters. with
Respect to Human Rights, TT 1, 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/47 (Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter U.N. Rep. of
Chair-Rapporteur Espinosa, 2017]; Maria Fernanda Espinosa (Chair-Rapporteur), Rep. on the
First Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corps. &
Other Bus. Enters. with Respect to Human Rights, with the Mandate of Elaborating an Int'l Legally
Binding Instrument, TT 1, 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/50 (Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Rep. of
Chair-Rapporteur Espinosa, 2016]. Since 2014, a working group established by the Human Rights
Council has been focused on developing an internationally legally binding instrument to regulate
multinational corporations and other business entities regarding international human rights law.
See U.N. Report of Chair-Rapporteur Espinosa, 2017, supra, T 1; UN Report of Chair-Rapporteur
Espinosa, 2016, supra, ¶ 1; Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, at 1-2
(July 14, 2014).
80. See Guillaume Long (Chair-Rapporteur), Rep. on the Third Session of the Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters. With Respect to
Human Rights, ¶¶ 54-55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/67 (Jan. 24, 2018) (noting that some delegations
disagreed that all human rights should be included due to the lack of universality of many human
rights).
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human rights unless required under domestic law, despite UN
suggestions that companies do SO. 8 1
Although the state has responsibility to promote human rights
under ICESCR, enforcing that duty can be challenging. For example,
although the UN has clarified the scope of the right to health, these
interpretations are not self-executing. 82 In addition, although the UN
has stated that nations and companies should not pressure developing
countries to enact TRIPS-plus agreements, that has had no impact,
likely since there is no effective enforcement means.83 After all, the
international system focuses primarily on voluntary state action and
even reporting. 4 Recognizing the difficulties with enforcement, the UN
has adopted a mechanism to permit individuals to complain about
enforcement of rights against nations, but only after exhausting
domestic remedies.85 However, this only applies to the minority of
81. See id.; U.N. Rep. of Rapporteur Hunt, 2006, supra note 17, ¶ 92 (discussing the
emerging consensus that corporations have human rights obligations).
82. See CESCR Gen. Comment No. 14, supra note 64, ¶ 53 (noting that a right to health
can strengthen the position of health ministries at the national level, thus implying no immediate
binding obligation); Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard:
Advancing a Collective Human Right to Public Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 125
(2005). See generally Stephen P. Marks, Normative Expansion of the Right to Health and the
Proliferation of Human Rights, 49 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 97, 117 (2016) (noting that outside
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, there is no legally binding human right
instrument regarding the right to health, nor political will to do so).
83. See U.N. Rep. of Rapporteur Hunt, 2006, supra note 17, ¶¶ 64, 87 (stating that (1)
nations should not pressure developing countries into enacting TRIPS plus agreements and (2)
companies have fallen short of enforcement mechanisms anticipated by human rights).
84. See Judith R. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Future of Human Rights Accountability
for Global Health Through the Universal Periodic Review, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL HEALTH:
RIGHTS-BASED GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBALIZING WORLD 537, 549 (Benjamin Mason Meier &
Lawrence 0. Gostin eds., 2018). The UN subsidiary organizations do not directly enforce human
rights, but rather, have committees of experts who engage in fact-finding, monitor state
implementation, and interpret treaty obligations through general comments. See Benjamin Mason
Meier & Virginia Bris Gomes, Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Monitoring, Interpreting, and
Adjudicating Health-Related Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL HEALTH: RIGHTS-
BASED GOVERNANCE FOR A GLOBALIZING WORLD 509, 509 (Benjamin Mason Meier & Lawrence 0.
Gostin eds., 2018). However, states may disregard commitments; despite the existence of the
Universal Periodic Review system for reporting and recommendations of states, that system is not
legally binding. See Mesquita et al., supra, at 549. Indeed, one commentator has asserted that the
extent to which ICESCR is binding on state parties is "questionable" due to its vague language,
especially regarding the human right to health, and that any ICESCR comments that aim to
provide clarity to rights are nonbinding. James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in
Investment Arbitration: Evidence ofInternational Law's Unity, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 77, 95
(2007); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (providing a narrow list of customary human rights that does not include
rights dealing with social, economic, or cultural rights, but including issues such as genocide,
torture, and systematic racial discrimination).
85. G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, art. 2-3(1) (Dec. 10, 2008).
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countries that have adopted it.86 In addition, this mechanism still only
addresses state violations of human rights and would not address the
extent to which corporate actions impact human rights.87 Although the
UN has recognized that corporations should respect human rights, its
discussion tends to focus on the most heinous human rights violations
that amount to international crimes, such as genocide and human
trafficking, rather than the rights at issue here.88
B. Applying Human Rights in Investment Disputes
While a number of human rights could be relevant to investor-
state disputes, a key question is how these rights might come into play.
In most IIAs, there is no reference to human rights at all.89 As such,
human rights would only be relevant to the extent a tribunal considered
them as part of the broader interpretive context.90 Human rights issues
have only been raised relatively recently in the context of investment
86. See Status of Treaties: Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.T.S (Oct. 11, 2018, 7:35 PM)
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TRE 1TY&mtdsg-no=IV-3-a&chapter=
4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/7B8W-GVLQ (listing current members).
87. See G.A. Res. 63/117, supra note 85, art. 2. In addition, it is unclear what impact, if
any, this has had since it came into effect in 2013. A law journal search for mentions of this
Convention did not find discussion of any specific uses. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin & Eric A.
Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention on Global Health: A Transformative Agenda for
Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 37 (2013); Alicia Ely Yamin &
Angela Duger, Adjudicating Health-Related Rights: Proposed Considerations for the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Other Supra-National
Tribunals, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. 80, 103 (2016) (briefly mentioning Optional Protocol); see also THE
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 194 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2016) (providing extensive explanation
of the Convention focused on future, rather than past use).
88. See, e.g., John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Interim Rep.
of the Special Representative of the Sec'y-Gen. on the Issue of Human Rights & Transnational
Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., ¶¶ 60-61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).
89. See MOUYAL, supra note 65, at 4, 141 (noting that explicit references to human rights
are rare, and that even references to issues consistent with human rights such as health and
environment have until recently also been rare).
90. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, ¶ 3(c), opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. Of course,
this is entirely permissible and scholars have indeed suggested that human rights should be
invoked as part of the interpretive context. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Unification Rather Than
Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human
Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 45, 56-61
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); Susan L. Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in
Investor-State Arbitration, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 423, 433, 442 (2013) (noting that tribunals
can consider international human rights pursuant to ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, and also that
some IIAs have language that could support a human rights interpretation); see also supra note
16 (noting scholars who have suggested investment tribunals embrace human rights to promote
public interest).
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disputes.9 1 Nonetheless, scholars and some advocates have previously
suggested that tribunals more broadly embrace human rights in
interpreting IIAs in order to provide states more freedom to regulate. 92
However, investors can and sometimes have relied on human rights to
support investment claims. 93
How human rights would be used by tribunalists in interpreting
investment claims is a tricky issue given that there are competing
rights. Balancing competing human rights is generally difficult. 94
There is no hierarchy among human rights, except perhaps for a few
that have jus cogens status, such as the right to be free from torture. 9 5
In addition, promotion of one right can undercut another. For example,
as noted earlier, the ICESCR supports the interests of creators as well
as users.96 However, the rights of users to benefit from scientific
progress is not robustly recognized as a human right.9 7 Some have
suggested that these competing rights should limit overly broad
patents, as well as patents on minimally inventive drugs that may
overly protect commercial profits.9 8 In addition, the human right for
91. See, e.g., MOUYAL, supra note 65, at 146-51 (discussing examples of human rights in
investment disputes only from 1989 and later, even though disputes have taken place for more
than fifty years).
92. See Sheffer, supra note 16, at 502-21 (suggesting investment agreements should
explicitly declare tribunals competent to address human rights laws so that host states can raise
human rights defenses); Gabisa, supra note 16, at 163-64, 165-66 (noting that international
investment practice should not be divorced form general international law, such that human rights
obligations should be considered, and also suggesting that human rights issues can be raised, even
though decisions to date have given "little or no attention" to such issues).
93. E.g., Karamanian, supra note 90, at 422, 433 (noting investors relying on human
rights principles such as due process and discrimination).
94. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human
Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1122-23 (2007).
95. See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (June 25, 1993) (asserting that the international community
must place human rights on the same footing); Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an
International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 97, 114 (2004) (stating that jus cogens norms, such as the prohibition against torture,
are superior to customary international law). All human rights are considered to stand on the same
footing, except for those with jus cogens status. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights,
supra; de Wet, supra. For the few human rights with jus cogens status, they have higher status
than other human rights. See MOUYAL, supra note 65, at 97. States may not deviate from rights
that have jus cogeas status and any attempt to enter agreements that limit these rights would be
invalid. See Jus Cogens, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/jus%20cogens [https://perma.cc/RVR4-YW8L] (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).
96. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text
97. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property, 69 SMU L. REV. 37, 39, 41 (2016) (noting that the right to science and culture is a
relatively underexplored area and the only provision in article 15 of the ICESCR for which there
is currently no interpretive comment) [hereinafter Yu, Anatomy of Human Rights].
98. See CESCR General Comment No. 17, supra note 6, ¶ 35 (noting that IP is inherently
a social product and that states have an obligation to prevent unreasonably high costs for access
to essential medicines); Rep. of High Comm'r of Hum. Rts., The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-
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innovators and creators is not identical to the scope of IP, since IP is
merely an incentive.99 Innovators have no human right to any
particular form of patent protection.100 However, these suggestions
only address dealing with human rights in isolation and not solely as
interpretive context to core obligations under IIA. In addition, the
human right to health, including the right to affordable essential
medicines, may compete with an arguable human right to property.
It is especially unclear how an investment tribunal might
consider competing human rights to interpret explicit investment
provisions-especially to the extent that IIAs generally do not even
reference human rights. Traditional rules of interpretation would
suggest that IIA language be given primacy. There might be more
leeway to consider human rights if there was an actual conflict between
explicitly conflicting obligations. However, such an express conflict
seems unlikely in the context of challenges to domestic actions limiting
IP norms. The situation parallels the TRIPS context where there is no
consensus on whether TRIPS expressly conflicts with the human right
to health or how to address such a conflict. 101 Although the UN has
suggested that human rights under the ICESR have primacy over
international agreements, such as TRIPS, 102 none of these
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) [hereinafter Rep. of High Comm'r Hum. Rts., TRIPS
Impact]. One scholar goes further in suggesting that the human right to benefit from scientific
progress should focus on the most vulnerable and disadvantaged, rather than profits for creators
or improvements to the affluent. See Audrey R. Chapman, Towards an Understanding of the Right
to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 1, 14 (2009).
99. See CESCR General Comment No. 17, supra note 68, ¶ 35 (noting that states have a
duty to prevent unreasonably high costs for essential medicines and a duty to prevent use of
scientific knowledge contrary to human rights, including the right to health, which may involve
excluding some inventions form patentability when that would conflict with other human rights);
U.N. Rep. of Special Rapporteur Shaheed, supra note 46, ¶ 32 (noting that contrary to IP, human
rights are inalienable).
100. U.N. Rep. of Special Rapporteur Shaheed, supra note 46, T 90 (noting no such right
under ICESCR).
101. See, e.g., Sub-Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/07, ¶ 2 (Aug. 17, 2017) (noting
actual or potential conflicts between TRIPS and human rights and that human rights should have
primacy); Lawrence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Co-existence, 5
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 47, 47 (2003); Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human
Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753, 792 (2002) (noting no conflict between WTO provisions and human
rights treaty unless WTO mandates or prohibits an action that human rights treaty prohibits or
mandates, which would be rare); Yu, supra note 94, at 1042 (arguing that focus should be on how
to resolve tension and providing some suggestions without necessarily adopting UN
recommendation that human rights should always trump). These different views of conflicts reflect
different interpretations of what constitutes a conflict. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 62, at 66
(noting that narrowly defining a conflict to only exist if an IP treaty mandates activity barred by
a human rights agreement would likely result in no conflicts, but a broader interpretation of
conflict to consider incompatible behavior might hold otherwise).
102. See Sub-Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/07, supra note 101, pmbl., T 3
(noting human rights have primacy); G.A. Res. 65/216, Globalization and Its Impact on Full
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interpretations are legally binding.103 Indeed, prior investor-state
tribunals have held that human rights obligations do not present a
conflict with investment norms. 104 This is perhaps not surprising since
the field of human rights is not an area that tribunalists are typically
familiar with; they are typically chosen for knowledge in the field of
investment, rather than human rights.105 Nonetheless, investment
claims may still impact human rights. 106
C. Eli Lilly Facts and Claims
Before reexamining the Eli Lilly case using a human rights lens,
it is important to first review the basic facts and claims at issue.
Accordingly, this section first revisits the essential facts underlying Eli
Lilly's dispute, followed by an explanation of the investment claims.
1. Facts Underlying Eli Lilly's Dispute
The investment dispute against Canada was initiated after Eli
Lilly exhausted domestic options to obtain patents on profitable drugs
sold as Strattera and Zyprexa. 107 In both situations, patents were
denied because Eli Lilly's patents failed to meet Canada's "promise
doctrine," a judicial interpretation of the core patent requirement of
Enjoyment of Human Rights, ¶¶ 19-34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001) (noting IP
undermines human rights); Rep. of High Comm'r of Hum. Rts., TRIPS Impact, supra note 98, 1 22
(noting that IP laws must promote access and opposing TRIPS plus treaties); Yu, supra note 94,
at 1041 (human rights to have primacy).
103. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 62, at 54-56.
104. For example, countries have not prevailed in asserting that investment claims
interfere with human rights obligations, such as the right to provide water. See, e.g., Suez v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 260-64 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter
Suez, Decision on Liability], https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0826.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCC5-BN3K] (rejecting assertion by Argentina and amici
that the right to water trumps BIT obligations in the context of rejecting defense of necessity in
privatizing water and sewage systems that impacted the foreign investor because defense of
necessity was not met based on tribunal's assessment that Argentina could have adopted other
methods to avoid violating investor rights and that Argentina was at least in part responsible for
the situation); Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 3 (July 14,
2006) [hereinafter Azurix, Award], https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0061.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CFR-GA8L] (rejecting Argentina's proposition that a
conflict between a BIT and human rights should be resolved in favor of human rights and asserting
that "it fail[ed] to understand the incompatibility").
105. See, e.g., lona Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and Human
Rights Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 311, 337
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
106. See Rep. of the Indep. Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable Int'l
Order, supra note 39, ¶ 12 (asserting investment agreements adversely impact human rights).
107. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, ¶ 21 (noting that trial court decisions
were unsuccessfully appealed and the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to hear further
appeals).
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utility that exists under both NAFTA and TRIPS that was overturned
in a separate case after the Lilly dispute.10s This doctrine only applied
to certain situations where a patent must establish utility. In
particular, it only applied when a patent applicant, such as Eli Lilly,
"promised" that an invention will have a particular purpose. 109
Typically, an applicant would only make such a promise if it had
previously obtained a more fundamental patent, such as the chemical
composition of a drug, and later wanted to obtain an additional patent
on a new use of that drug. An application satisfied the promise doctrine
if it disclosed data to support such a promise. 110 Eli Lilly had to make
such promises because it had already received at least one full term of
patent protection for the basic chemical compound underlying each
drug, and was seeking additional protection after earlier patents
expired.' The invalidated patent on Strattera failed to satisfy its
promise of treating Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) as
a chronic condition; the court found the patent failed to include any data
to establish that it would be efficacious for long-term use.112 The
invalidated patent on Zyprexa was similarly found to promise a
superior treatment for long-term treatment of psychosis without
supporting data.1 13
A major issue in the dispute was whether it was significant that
Canada's promise doctrine was unique, as Eli Lilly and others
sympathetic to pharmaceutical companies highlighted.114 Admittedly,
Canada's promise doctrine diverged from the utility doctrines of most
countries.115 However, as some patent scholars have noted, different
jurisdictions use different patentability standards to achieve the same
goal as the promise doctrine; for example, the United States polices a
108. E.g., id., ¶¶ 51-53, ¶¶ 62-64. After this investment dispute, the Supreme Court of
Canada abolished the doctrine in a case involving an invention that satisfied one, but not all,
promises made, although it left the door open to a different patent law doctrine to govern similar
behavior. AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943 (Can.); see also Canada's Su-
preme Court Abolishes Controversial Promise Doctrine, PCK (June 30, 2017),
https://www.pckip.com/patent/promise-doctrine-abolished-one-use-mere-scintilla-utility-will-sat-
isfy-utility-requirement [https://perma.cc/5TAT-25WU].
109. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, para. 76 (Can.).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Eli Lilly v. Canada, Case No. UNCT/14/2, Government of Canada Statement
of Defence, 1 53 (June 30, 2014), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3253.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M8H-ZQZZ] [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Government of
Canada Statement of Defence].
112. See Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co. [2010] F.C. 915, para. 60 (Can. Ont.)
113. See Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2011] F.C. 1288, para. 218 (Can. Ont.).
114. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, TT 34-39.
115. See id. ¶¶ 34-39 (explaining unique nature of Canada laws).
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similar problem through the patent doctrine of "written description." 1 6
These different patent doctrines have the same essential goal of
limiting the social cost of patents in terms of higher prices to the most
worthwhile inventions. These doctrines all share the same goal of
helping to ensure that an inventor has disclosed something of adequate
value before a patent is granted. 117
Although not explicitly addressed by Canada, the Eli Lilly
dispute implicitly challenged TRIPS flexibilities. 118 In particular,
TRIPS contains identical language to NAFTA's IP chapter concerning
domestic obligations to provide patents to "inventions" that meet key
requirements that are undefined. 119 In other words, both TRIPS and
NAFTA provide member states flexibilities with respect to undefined
key requirements, which include the definition of utility. 1 2 0 Although
most countries embracing TRIPS flexibilities have chosen to interpret
other aspects of patentability, like what constitutes a patentable
"invention" or what is "new,"1 21 the notion of TRIPS flexibilities applies
to all undefined patent requirements. A PhRIA press release after the
award suggests a goal of Eli Lilly's dispute was to directly challenge
such flexibilities. 122
116. See id.; Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Second Expert Report of Timothy R.
Holbrook, T 5 (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ITA%20LAW%207020.pdf [https://perma.ce/23MD-8RDF]; Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2, Expert Report of Timothy R. Holbrook, T 7 (Jan. 26, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4137.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HL7S-8FE4]; E. Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around
the World, 30 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 35, 53-57, 61-77 (2014); Dmitry Karshtedt, The
Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949, 974-76 (2015). But see, Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Application for Leave to File a Non-Disputing Party
Amicus Curiae Submission by Intellectual Property Law Professors (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7150.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ37-
WSWS] (opposing view by seven law professors). However, as explained by Canada, the opposing
view of these law professors is not supported. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2, Government of Canada Observations on Issues Raised in Amicus Submissions, ¶ 18
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7264.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6GU-BNAX].
117. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966) ("[A] patent is not a hunting
license."); Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, paras. 70, 76 (Can.).
118. See supra 44-46 (explaining how the Eli Lilly dispute challenges TRIPS flexibilities);
Ho, Collision Course, supra note 15, 440-53 (discussing how the Eli Lilly dispute threatens TRIPS
flexibilities). See generally Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2.
119. Compare TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 27(2), with North American Free Trade Agreement,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1709(2), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
120. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 27; NAFTA, supra note 119, art. 1709(2).
121. See, e.g., The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (2005), § 3(d) (limiting the
definition of what is an invention within the meaning of the Act).
122. See Press Release, PhRMA, supra note 44 (noting that because Canada is the "only
country" with its interpretation of utility law, it breaks "the letter and spirit" of international rules
on IP).
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In addition, a different type of TRIPS flexibility was implicitly
challenged by Eli Lilly's claim that the promise doctrine improperly
discriminates against pharmaceuticals as a field of technology in
violation of NAFTA and TRIPS. 123 WTO jurisprudence makes an
important distinction between legitimate differentiation and improper
discrimination, which is also supported by the Declaration on
Regulatory Sovereignty. 124 A WTO panel noted that there is no
prohibition against dealing with problems that may exist only in certain
product areas. 125 Notably, the panel stated that even when a country
intended to regulate a particular area, it did not constitute implicit
discrimination since "preoccupation" with the impact of a law to one
area is not discriminatory unless there is evidence that the broader
purpose is a "sham."126 Nothing indicates that the promise doctrine was
a "sham." A court applied this doctrine to a mechanical invention. 127
The fact that more pharmaceutical patents were invalidated could
simply reflect that the industry was violating the doctrine, rather than
indicating that the doctrine discriminates against the industry.128
Nonetheless, if the tribunal had been sympathetic to Eli Lilly's position,
this would have immediately contradicted current WTO norms that are
well recognized. 129
Canada's promise doctrine addressed a key issue in the
pharmaceutical industry that is of particular concern to those who
advocate using TRIPS flexibilities. In an attempt to maximize revenue,
the pharmaceutical industry has a practice of sequentially patenting
123. Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, TT 66, 79.
124. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without
Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 445, 450-53 (2007) (agreeing with differentiation goal and further arguing that
there should be no discrimination so long as a legitimate purpose is demonstrated); Matthias
Lamping et al., Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty Under TRIPS 4 (Max
Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Research Paper No. 14-19, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2500784 [https://perma.cc/67E4-GNDQ].
125. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, T 7.92,
WT/DS114/R (adopted March 17, 2000).
126. Id. T 7.104.
127. Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limitde v. Eurocopter, [2013] FCA 219 (Can). In
addition, before changes to Canadian patent law eliminated the promise doctrine after the
conclusion of the Eli Lilly investment dispute, the Canadian Manual on patent examining
procedure used a mechanical example. See CAN. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, KlA OC9, MANUAL
OF PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE, T 12.08 (2016), http://publications.ge.ca/collections/collection-
2016/opic-cipo/lu7l-4-9-2016-2-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LX8-Q362]; see also Ho, supra note
15, Collison Course, at 447 (discussing this provision).
128. Indeed, it has long been recognized that uniform patent standards may result in
different applications to different technologies. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003).
129. See generally Lamping et al., supra note 124 (discussing the importance of state
discretion-within the confines of international law-in making patent system decisions).
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minor modifications or different uses of a drug after first obtaining a
patent on the basic chemical compound.1 30 The industry considers this
appropriate "life cycle management." 131  However, public health
advocates and some governments, including both India and member
states of the European Union, consider this to be an inappropriate way
of "evergreening" patent profits. 132 In other words, profits will continue
(be "ever green") if companies can patent different aspects of a drug
such that they can continue to charge high prices on the same drug even
after the initial patent expires.
Eli Lilly's patents illustrate how Canada's promise doctrine
addressed this problem. Both of the invalidated patents were attempts
to obtain additional patent protection after the original patent on the
underlying chemical compound had expired.133 Moreover, Eli Lilly did
not even make any modifications to the compound, but instead simply
attempted to claim-without any basis-that it had a new use.134
2. Eli Lilly's Investment Claims
Eli Lilly asserted two separate investment claims pursuant to
the investment chapter of NAFTA against Canada based on the
invalidation of two patents. 135 Eli Lilly claimed (1) that the invalidated
patents constituted expropriation because the value of its patents were
destroyed and (2) that it was denied fair and equitable treatment. 136
These represent prototypical investment claims, but Eli Lilly's basis for
these claims are notable.
130. See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R40917, PATENT "EVERGREENING":
ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 3 (2009); Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening
Problem, 185 CAN. MED. Assoc. J. E385 (2013); Rebecca S. Yoshitani & Ellen S. Cooper,
Pharmaceutical Reformulation: The Growth of Life Cycle Management, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 379, 380 (2007).
131. See, e.g., TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT:
MAKING THE MOST OF EACH AND EVERY BRAND, at xx (2012); Vandana Prajapati et al., Product
Lifecycle Management Through Patents and Regulatory Strategies, 13 J. MED. MARKETING 171,
171 (2013).
132. E.g., Novartis A.G. v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 (India); European Comm'n,
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report, at 103 (Nov. 28, 2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary.report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GJM6-CW8Y]; TONY HARRIS ET AL., PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW REPORT
106-07 (2013), https://www.ipaustralia.gov.aulsites/g/files/net856/f/2013-05-
27_ppr-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RR6-SN6N]; Nathalie Vernaz et al., Patented Drug
Extension Strategies on Health Care Spending: A Cost-Evaluation Analysis, 10 PLOS MED.
e1001460 (2013).
133. See Eli Lilly, Government of Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 111, TT 3-4.
134. See, e.g., id. ¶ 4.
135. Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 3-4, 74-84.
136. Id. T¶ 74-84.
[Vol. 21:2:437464
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO ISD
Eli Lilly asserted that its patents were indirectly expropriated
based on a variety of reasons. Indirect expropriation claims are often
made when investments lose value, 137 which would seem to apply here.
However, one could alternatively argue that canceled patents should
not be considered an investment at all. 1 38 Eli Lilly asserted that
indirect expropriation was supported by alleged violations of
international IP standards, including the patent requirements under
NAFTA that mirror TRIPS patentability requirements. 1 3 9  In
particular, it asserted that the promise doctrine was a change in the
law that Eli Lilly could not have anticipated. 140 Eli Lilly also claimed
that invalidations of its patents were "contrary to the public purpose"
of patents to provide an exclusive right-even though patents are
routinely invalidated when they are found to fail patentability
requirements. 14 1  Lastly, it asserted that the promise doctrine
discriminates against pharmaceutical patents in violation of NAFTA's
patent requirements, which again mirror TRIPS. 142
Eli Lilly also alleged that Canada violated FET because the
judicial invalidations were allegedly arbitrary and inconsistent with its
legitimate expectation of a stable business and legal environment. 143 In
particular, Eli Lilly alleged that it could not have anticipated that the
Canadian law on utility would be "so drastically altered" and also
"retroactively applied" to invalidate its patents. 144 There was a factual
dispute concerning whether Canada's laws had changed at all, let alone
whether they were drastically changed. 145 Nonetheless, the FET claim
threatened TRIPS flexibilities. In particular, Eli Lilly's investment
claim is fundamentally premised on the assumption that nations cannot
modify laws, completely contrary to domestic and international
norms. 146 It is in fact routine for common law countries like Canada
and the United States to change standards of patentability. 14 7 The
United States has, for example, changed the standards of
137. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 119, art. 1110; see also SUZYH. NIKIEMA, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV, BEST PRACTICES: INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 5 (2012).
138. See, e.g., Ho, Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 246.
139. Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, T 75.
140. Id. T 77.
141. Id. ¶ 78. However, patent law has never been static, such that companies should
expect modifications, including ones that result in invalidation of patents. See, e.g., Ho,
Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 271-72.
142. Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, T 79.
143. See id. ¶¶ 81-82.
144. Id. TT 82-83.
145. See Ho, Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 236 n.88 (noting controversy).
146. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, ¶ 34 (noting change in law); see also
id. ¶ 29 (asserting that Canada's utility law was different at the time NAFTA was signed).
147. See Ho, Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 271-72, 281.
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nonobviousness, as well as the scope of patentable subject matter, such
that previously issued patents were subsequently invalidated.148
D. Eli Lilly Revisited
This Section considers two possible extremes of how a broader
embrace of human rights norms might have impacted a tribunal's
consideration of Eli Lilly's investment claims. This Section also
contemplates hypothetical best and worst case scenarios of
incorporating human rights, even though it is likely that neither would
be a realistic outcome. Rather, the goal of this Section is to highlight
that although embracing human rights might initially seem to promote
domestic norms, it could alternatively simply reinforce existing
investment rights.
1. Human Rights to Promote Health and Scientific Progress Benefits
The best argument based on human rights would likely be that
the human right to benefit from scientific progress and the human right
to health should trump, or at least modify, interpretation of investment
claims. These arguments both prove difficult, as explained below.
Although some might consider it ideal for human rights to trump
investment claims in order to promote the human right to health as well
as state sovereignty,1 49 this seems unrealistic for a number of reasons.
First, tribunals have thus far rejected state attempts to rely on human
rights, such as the human right to water, as a complete defense from
investment claims.150 The rights at issue here, similar to the right to
water, lack a robust mechanism of enforcement at the international
level.15 ' In addition, most agreements, including NAFTA's investment
chapter, lack any explicit provision to promote human rights, or
alternatively, any exception to investor claims premised on human
148. See Steven Seidenberg, After Alice: Business-Method and Software Patents May Go
Through the Looking Glass, 101 A.B.A. J. 19 (2015); Donald Vinson, Key Cases Shaping the Future
for Patent Litigation Funders, LAw360 (Apr. 27, 2015, 10:13 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/646193/print?section=ip [https://perma.ce/2KHB-VXJS] (noting
that patent owners may reconsider pursuing infringement in light of the potential for validity
challenges).
149. In particular, those concerned about the extent to which IIAs tend to elevate corporate
interests about those of society may consider it preferable for human rights norms to be valued
over investment claims.
150. See supra note 104.
151. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty enforcing human
right to health).
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rights.152 Most investment agreements, including NAFTA's investment
chapter, actually have no exceptions at all to FET claims. 153 Moreover,
the argument that human rights should trump IP rights in the TRIPS
context has had limited impact. 154
The WTO experience is particularly instructive. Notably,
although the UN has repeatedly suggested that human rights should
have primacy over trade norms and noted actual or potential conflicts
with TRIPS, WTO jurisprudence thus far has not embraced human
rights in modifying explicit TRIPS requirements.1 5 5 Rather, the WTO
has arguably taken a very technical approach to treaty terms and
assumed that the final text should not be further interpreted in light of
other international agreements, even though that would be consistent
with general rules of interpretation under the Vienna Convention. 156
152. See, e.g., Kathryn Gordon et al., Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable Development and
Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey (Org. for Economic Cooperation & Dev.,
Working Paper No. 2014/01, 2014) (finding that only 0.5 percent of investment agreements contain
human rights considerations).
153. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 119, art. 1103; see also CPTPP, supra note 22, art. 9.6
(FET provision without exceptions).
154. Although the Doha Public Health Declaration is arguably consistent with the human
right to health, patents on essential medicines seem fundamentally inconsistent with UN
suggestions for human rights to trump IP. After all, if nations must provide patents, including on
essential medicines, human rights do not prevail. Although there are some who have advocated
this situation, there was no consensus in the UN 2016 High Level Panel Report; rather, this was
only the view of a minority. See U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 54 (comments
of Jorge Bermudez, Winnie Byanyima, and Shiba Phurailatpam suggesting drugs on the WHO
List of Essential Medicines be exempt from IP to promote the right to health). Moreover, a different
minority believed that the Panel Report already goes too far in even suggesting that nations use
TRIPS flexibilities. Id. at 57-58 (comments of Andrew Witty and Maria C. Freire noting that the
report "overstates" TRIPS flexibilities, disputing that nations have the right to self-define
patentability criteria, and suggesting TRIPS flexibilities will have negative long-term impacts on
promoting innovation for countries).
155. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Preliminary Rep. on Its
Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13, at 26 (2000) (prepared by J. Oloka-
Onyango & Deepika Udagama) (noting primacy of human rights law over all other regimes of
international law); Subcomm. on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/7, ¶¶ 3, 11 (August 17, 2000) (noting actual or potential conflicts and
urging states to recognize primacy of human rights over TRIPS).
156. See, e.g., Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, International Trade: Dispute Settlement,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 177, 208 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan
0. Sykes eds., 2007) (noting that panels tend to read treaty terms in "clinical isolation"); Dispute
Settlement Body, Proposal by the LDC Group: Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, T 5, WTO Doc. TNfDS/2/17 (Oct. 9, 2002) (noting concern that panels as well as
the Appellate Body show "an excessively sanitized concern with legalisms"); see also Sayed M.
Zonaid, Trading in Human Rights: Questioning the Advance of Human Rights into the World Trade
Organization, 27 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261, 282-91 (2015) (noting that despite an increased global focus
on human rights, they are still not broadly embraced at the WTO and arguing human rights could
be more broadly embraced, although also recognizing some possible issues). See generally VCLT,
supra note 90, arts. 31, 32.
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The WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions concerning IP are
actually generally criticized by academics for not fully promoting
human rights or public policy. 157 Although the 2001 Doha Public Health
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is considered
consistent with the human right to health,15 8 scholars have criticized
WTO panels for narrowly interpreting TRIPS. 159 The 2018 panel
decision upholding Australia's right to limit use of trademarks to
minimize tobacco use was a unique situation where the Declaration was
cited.160 However, this situation is unique in that it involves challenge
to a nation that is implementing an international agreement
fundamentally premised on the human right to health.
Given the minimal role human rights norms have played in
mediating TRIPS jurisprudence, the possibility of human rights norms
influencing investor-state disputes seems unlikely. After all, TRIPS
has some explicit language permitting consideration of domestic policy
that is consistent with human rights, 161 whereas most IIAs do not. 162
157. See, e.g., Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Toward Development, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 71; Susy Frankel, WTO Application of "The Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public
International Law" to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 397 (criticizing panel for
assuming TRIPS needs not further balancing); Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 433, 450-59 (2012) (criticizing WTO panel for failing to interpret the copyright exception
appropriately due to improperly assuming that similar language in GATT jurisprudence was
relevant, such that policy concerns were not considered); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and
Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727, 768 (2011) (criticizing panels for mentioning,
but not fully embracing, articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS). Some scholars have suggested that the WTO
take a more proactive approach. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Implementing an International
Instrument for Interpreting Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, 40 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 627, 629-31 (2009); Ruth L. Okediji, The Limits of Development Strategies at the
Intersection of Intellectual Property and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE, AND
DEVELOPMENT 355, 365 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007).
158. See CARLOS CORREA & DUNCAN MATTHEWS, THE DOHA DECLARATION TEN YEARS ON
AND ITS IMPACT ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 12-17 (2011) (noting that
the Doha Declaration is critical for realizing the right to health, including using TRIPS flexibilities
to promote access to affordable drugs).
159. See, e.g., Land, supra note 157, at 450-59. Of course, there has not been a WTO panel
decision since Doha for which access to medicine is an issue.
160. Moreover, it was to reinforce article 8 of TRIPS, which was already part of the
interpretive context. Panel Report, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco
Products and Packaging, WTO Docs. WT/DS435, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R, paras
7.2.3.9.5-7.2.4.1.1 (adopted June 28, 2018) (considering TRIPS article 8's mention of societal
interest to include public health as backdrop to interpreting what is a "justifiable" encumbrance
of trademarks pursuant to TRIPS article 20). Moreover, this decision focused on implementation
of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which has a strong public health focus.See supra
note 21 and accompanying text (concerning health focus of this Convention).
161. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 9, pmbl., arts. 7-8; see also World Trade Organization,
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
162. Only recently have IlAs expressly mentioned concerns about health issues. See, e.g.,
CANADIAN MODEL FIPA: AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND FOR THE PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS art. 11 (2004), https://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
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Moreover, WTO jurists-who tend to have a background in public
service-are considered far more sensitive to domestic concerns than
most who serve as tribunalists for investor-state disputes. 163  In
contrast, investment tribunals are typically comprised of lawyers who
are likely familiar with commercial law, rather than human rights. 164
The WTO experience shows that although there may be an academic or
moral argument for prioritizing human rights norms, this argument
can be hard to reconcile with explicit rights under an agreement,
whether it be TRIPS or an IIA.
Even using human rights to simply interpret but not overrule
investment claims may be tricky. As noted above, the WTO has been
reluctant to embrace human rights in its interpretation of TRIPS
provisions that expressly permit consideration of public policy. 1 6 5 In
addition, although the human right to health is well defined and
includes a right to access affordable medicine, the drugs at issue in Eli
Lilly were not essential medicines. 166 An argument could be made that
although Eli Lilly's drugs were not essential medicines, interpreting
investment claims in favor of Eli Lilly could negatively impact access to
essential medicines by creating a chilling effect on domestic laws
regarding essential medicines. However, this is obviously an
attenuated argument.
If a tribunal were inclined to embrace the human right to health,
as well as the right to benefit from scientific progress, it could
conceivably do so in a few ways. First, it could arguably read the scope
FIPA-model-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BXY-CE3W] (noting that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety, or environmental measures). In addition, recently
concluded agreements and proposed agreements that expressly mention domestic policy were
trumpeted as "state of the art" protections of traditionally domestic areas of discretion such as
health, safety, and the environment. See, e.g., OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., FACT SHEET: INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) (2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds [https://perma.cc/BQ4T-
3WPR].
163. Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment
Arbitrators Are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators are from Venus, 109 AM. J. IN'TL L. 761, 781-82
(2015). That said, since WTO panels are not to create new law and human rights only inform
interpretation of ambiguous phrases, it is perhaps not surprising the WTO has not broadly
embraced human rights in general or with respect to TRIPS. See generally id.
164. See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 12, at 38-41 (providing details of commonly
used arbitrators, including a number who work in the private sector); Pauwelyn, supra note 163,
at 773 (noting that most common background for ISDS arbitrators is private sector); Sergio Puig,
Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 655 (2016) (noting that a small group of
primarily commercial arbitrators serve as tribunalists and other times as counsel or party
experts); Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. ITN'L L. 387, 388, 402
(2014).
165. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 157, at 397.
166. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (20th ed.
2017), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/273826/EML20-eng.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/43XD-D34K] (not listing either of the drugs in the case).
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of investments narrowly to entirely exclude canceled patents from the
scope of investments. In particular, an argument could be made that
inventors only have human rights to benefit materially from their
inventions when their inventions are considered adequately valuable,
such as by complying with domestic patent requirements.1 6 7
The cancellation of a patent for failing to comply with
patentability requirements should indicate that the invention as
disclosed does not provide value to society. If that were the case, no
further analysis of the investment claims would be needed, since there
would be no investment to protect. In addition, even when inventors
have a human right related to scientific progress, that right notably
exists only for actual individuals and not companies that might own the
invention.
Alternatively, even if canceled patents were considered
investments, a claim for expropriation could be avoided by interpreting
NAFTA's existing exception from expropriation in light of human
rights. In particular, NAFTA, as well as many other investment
agreements, states that there is no expropriation of IP if a nation
cancels or revokes IP consistent with relevant IP norms. 168
Eli Lilly improperly asserted that Canada's laws were not
consistent because they were different than other countries and also
because its laws arguably changed after the patents at issue were
granted. 169 However, perhaps an embrace of human rights norms-
including the right to health, as well as the right of all to benefit from
scientific discoveries-would suggest that the facts relied upon by Eli
Lilly are irrelevant. After all, the UN has suggested that the human
right to health should be promoted by TRIPS flexibilities (i.e., by
reading undefined patent requirements in TRIPS (and NAFTA) in a
way that limits patents). 170
167. This seems especially true since the right of inventors to material benefits from their
discoveries is more debated than whether authors enjoy protection of moral and material interests.
See U.N. Rep. of Special Rapporteur Shaheed, supra note 46, ¶ 28 (noting that this is strongly
debated); Yu, Anatomy of the Human Rights, supra note 97, at 89. In addition, the UN has
cautioned that even if creators of scientific inventions are to enjoy material benefits, this does not
give such individuals the ability to challenge domestic laws as providing inadequate financial
remuneration and that this human right does not extend to corporations that own patents. U.N.
Rep. of Special Rapporteur Shaheed, supra note 46, ¶¶ 32-34.
168. NAFTA, supra note 119, art. 1110(7) (limiting expropriation claims if consistent with
NAFTA's own IP chapter which is similar to TRIPS); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
2004 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 6(5) (2012) (exempting compulsory licenses
issued in accordance with TRIPS from expropriation claims); United States-Chile Free Trade
Agreement, Chile-U.S., art. 10.9(5), June 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/chile-fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/3EWN-SP4Y] (exempting limitation of IP
consistent with the IP chapter of this agreement).
169. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, TT 34-39.
170. See, e.g., U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 22-23.
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Although not strictly required, there is some textual support for
embracing human rights norms in interpreting investment claims
under NAFTA. Obviously, tribunals are to interpret treaties in light of
the object and purpose of the agreement, including preambles.171 Under
NAFTA, the preamble not only mentions the need to promote
investment, but also the need to preserve "flexibility to safeguard the
public welfare." 172 In addition, NAFTA states that it is "inappropriate
to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health . . . measures." 173
This statement is made in the context of environmental measures, but
nonetheless could be relied upon to indicate that public welfare issues
are recognized by the parties.174 In addition, the FET claims under
NAFTA are expressly tied to international law.175 Granted, the FET
reference to international laws is made with respect to protecting
investor rights.176 However, there is at least an argument that since
international law is mentioned, NAFTA's text has some express
language to support interpreting investor rights in light of the broader
international context, including human rights norms.
2. Human Rights to Reinforce Investor Rights
There is a distinct possibility that an investment tribunal could
and would use human rights to reinforce investor rights and claims.
There are several reasons for this. First, human rights are, at best, part
of the broader interpretive context. In the past, tribunals have not
necessarily embraced, or even fully acknowledged, human rights
arguments in their final awards.177 In addition, even when human
171. VCLT, supra note 90, art. 31.
172. NAFTA, supra note 119, pmbl.
173. Id. art. 1114(2).
174. Id. (article is titled "Environmental Measures").
175. Id. art. 1105(1) ("Each party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment.").
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Biloune v. Ghana Invs. Ctr., 95 INT'L. L. REP. 197, 203 (1989) (noting Tribunal
"competence is limited to commercial disputes ... other matters-however compelling the claim
or wrongful the alleged act-are outside this Tribunal's jurisdiction."); Moshe Hirsch, Investment
Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND ARBITRATION 97, 99 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (noting consistent trend of
tribunals to decline to consider specific international human rights instruments, although for
different reasons); Silvia Steininger, What's Human Rights Got to Do With It? An Empirical
Analysis ofHuman Rights References in Investment Arbitration, 31 LEIDEN J. INT'LL. 33, 44 (2018).
However, in a number of cases, the tribunal decision was consistent with the amicus position
promoting human rights, which might suggest that it was influential, even if not cited. Sarah
Schadendorf, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Analysis of ICSID and
NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, 10 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. 1, 11, 23 (2013). Indeed, it has
been suggested that too robust an embrace of human rights norms would actually be improper and
grounds for annulment. See Knoll-Tudor, supra note 105, at 336.
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rights are mentioned in awards, regional-rather than international-
norms tend to be the focus. 178 Moreover, tribunals may cite rights under
regional agreements, even if they are not directly binding on the
parties.179
A tribunal could rely on human rights, including those from only
regional agreements, in favor of investors and their rights. In
particular, although there is not a right to property under the ICESCR,
there is a right to property in the European Court of Human Rights, to
which tribunals often refer even if not binding on disputes.180 Notably,
this court is the source of the most rulings of any international forum
except for the European Court of Justice. 181 In fact, it has been
suggested that arbitrators sensitive to criticism cite to European
human rights law as a way to respond to criticism about lack of
legitimacy or incursion of domestic sovereignty, even if such law is cited
in a way that may still tend to promote investor rights. 182 In addition,
other sources suggest a right to property for corporations that could
reinforce existing investment claims. For example, the UDHR supports
a right to property and also supports the idea that entities, in addition
to individuals, have such a right. 183 In addition, some scholars have
argued that such a right exists.184 Although this is controversial, it
would be easy for a tribunal to rely on this, as well as the European
Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, as interpretive context to
reinforce investment claims.
Although NAFTA's preamble is not as limited as some
agreements that focus solely on promoting investment, it is unclear how
a tribunal would read the preamble.185 After all, unlike a pure
investment agreement, NAFTA addresses multiple topics beyond
178. See e.g., Steininger, supra note 177, at 35.
179. See id. at 49. A number of tribunals cite to the European Convention of Human Rights,
including in cases that do not involve countries bound to this agreement, which could be a function
of the well-developed case law of the European Court of Human Rights, especially regarding right
to property. Id. at 40.
180. Id.; see also ICESCR, supra note 66.
181. Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Use (and Misuse) of European Human Rights Law in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, in THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (Franco Ferrari ed. 2017).
182. Id. at 55-56.
183. UDHR, supra note 73, art. 17.
184. See, e.g., Sprankling, supra note 76, at 479. But see Yu, Anatomy of Human Rights,
supra note 97, at 92-95 (questioning a human right to property).
185. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 135 (2008) (noting that survey of OECD-
country IIAs found that many include a short preamble that does not focus on social issues,
although that is changing in recent years); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT
LAW 126 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2010) (noting that most IIA preambles focus
on investment conditions, and that tribunals rely on these to interpret investment claims).
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investment.186  Therefore, the non-investment language could be
considered not to apply when interpreting investment claims.
Alternatively, the language about safeguarding the "public welfare" is
so broad that the outcome of relying on this is unclear.187 In particular,
a tribunal could consider that the public welfare is safeguarded by
protecting investor rights, rather than narrowly interpreting investor
rights in favor of promoting more domestic discretion. After all, some
argue that protecting investor rights is better for the public at large,
since foreign investment allegedly can improve the economic welfare of
a nation.188 It is difficult to determine in the abstract whether a
tribunal would go so far, especially in a current climate where decisions
are scrutinized. Nonetheless, it is worth considering that such broad
language is capable of more than one interpretation.
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE
Since a broader embrace of human rights presents challenges
and perhaps even serious pitfalls, it is important to consider what steps
should be taken in the future.189 This Part offers two major suggestions.
The first suggestion is to raise more awareness that investor-state
disputes create a problem for IP norms, especially the existing sliver of
domestic policy space under TRIPS. The second is to encourage
tribunals to continue with principles that promote policy space short of
a full embrace of all human rights norms, including mechanisms that
promote more deference.
A. Raising Awareness of the Problem
An important initial step to fixing the problem is to raise
awareness of the tension posed by investor-state disputes for domestic
IP rights, including the need to preserve policy space under TRIPS.
Without recognition of the problem, it is difficult to build necessary
186. See generally NAFTA, supra note 119. For example, NAFTA covers trade in goods,
trade in services, financial services, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, and
intellectual property. See NAFTA, supra note 119, pt. two (trade in goods); id. pt. three (technical
barriers to trade); id. pt. four (government procurement); id. pt. six (intellectual property).
187. Id. pmbl. (noting that governments have agreed to "preserve their flexibility to
safeguard the public welfare").
188. See, e.g., Investment, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-
areas/services-investment/investment [https://perma.cc/5BWE-MH74] (last visited Oct. 24, 2018)
(noting the importance of investment and that IIAs promote investment).
189. This step can be taken along with raising human rights considerations in investment
disputes. However, as just discussed, raising human rights issues does not guarantee desired
results with respect to protecting TRIPS flexibilities, and in fact may reinforce investor rights. See
supra Section III.D.2.
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consensus to address it. As mentioned earlier, the initial disputes could
portend an important and serious threat to TRIPS flexibilities.190 In
addition, the extent of the problem may be even worse than currently
known since disputes under some arbitration rules permit parties to
keep the existence of a dispute, including documents regarding the
initiation of the dispute, completely confidential. 191 Although scholars
are increasingly focusing on how investment disputes challenge TRIPS
flexibilities, the issue remains inadequately understood. 192 This is well
illustrated by the fact that the highly publicized 2016 UN High Level
Panel Report as a way to reconcile IP, health, and trade interests
recommends TRIPS flexibilities without acknowledging that they may
not be realistic if states fear investor-state disputes. 193  This is
especially true for developing countries that are encouraged to adopt
these flexibilities, but would lack financial resources to defend an
investment dispute. After all, even developed countries have either
abandoned sound domestic policy regulations or deferred
implementation to avoid investor-state disputes. 194
Of course, how to raise awareness can be more challenging, but
can be done, nonetheless. Only in recent years has consensus developed
concerning a need to seriously evaluate and potentially reform the ISDS
system. 195 Although tribunalists and some states may be opposed to
any suggestion that would change the status quo, there is widespread
discussion of the need for reform by both developed and developing
countries. 196 One such actor is the European Union; while it once
robustly supported ISDS, it now advocates serious reform of the system
190. See supra Section I.B.
191. See Ho, Collision Course, supra note 15, at 406-07.
192. See, e.g., id. at 435. Of course, Vanderbilt's symposium is a refreshing change. In
addition, along similar lines, scholars from around the world devoted two days to discussing the
intersection of IP and investment disputes. See Enforcing IP in Trade and Investment: What
Safeguards for Its Social Function?, CTR. FOR INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. STUD.,
http://www.ceipi.edu/en/library-and-publications/proceedings-of-conferences/enforcing-
intellectual-property-in-trade-and-investment-agreements-what-safeguards-for-its-social-
function/ [https://perma.cc/5L4D-RA75] (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) (providing videos of talks from
two-day conference).
193. See U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 9. Moreover, only one of the
six supplemental commentaries to the report mentioned ISDS as an issue. Id. at 54 (suggesting
that FTAs should be revised to exclude TRIPS-plus measures and ISDS).
194. See, e.g., Gathii & Ho, supra note 11, at 451-52 (explaining that Canada ceased efforts
to enact plain packaging after a threat of an investment dispute). Similarly, New Zealand took a
"wait and see" attitude after Australia was challenged with an investment dispute. See Eric
Crosbie & Forge Thomson, Why Did It Take 53 Months for NZ to Introduce Plain Cigarette Packs?,
NOTED (June 14, 2018), https://www.noted.co.nz/healthlhealthlplain-cigarette-packs-introduction-
delayed-in-nz/ [https://perma.cc/27YR-QJPS].
195. See Roberts & Bouraoui, supra note 32.
196. See id.
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that would include a multilateral investment court.197  Notably, the
Eurpoean Union's change in approach occurred largely due to concerns
raised by member states, as well as the broader public. 198
Accordingly, awareness of investor-state disputes is quite
important. Broader discussion of this problem by all those concerned
about TRIPS flexibilities-including the UN, WHO, WTO/TRIPS
Council, as well as NGOs and relevant policymakers-would be
valuable. Broader discussion of the tension between TRIPS and human
rights was previously helpful in shining a spotlight on the tension that
led to the human-rights-informed 2001 Doha Public Health
Declaration, as well as subsequent efforts to promote use of TRIPS
flexibilities.199
B. Near-Term Stopgap Measures
The promotion of domestic policy space regarding IP rights
without a full embrace of human rights norms presents a tricky issue.
This is especially difficult under the existing structure of investment
disputes that are decided by a small group of arbitrators under a
financial structure that incentivizes them to rule in favor of investors,
or at least craft opinions that leave the door open for future claims.
Increasing arbitrator independence via reform of the qualifications to
be an arbitrator would be desirable but challenging to implement,
197. Compare European Comm'n, Incorrect Claims About Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, at 1-4 (2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc-151790.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PQ26-QQ7V] (defending investor-state disputes), with European Comm'n,
Investment in TTIP and Beyond-the Path for Reform: Enhancing the Right to Regulate and
Moving from Current Ad Hoc Arbitrations Towards an Investment Court, at 1 (2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF [https://perma.cc/2EPZ-
MWRF] (outlining new suggestions for ISDS reform).
198. See C6cile Barbibre, France and Germany United Front Against ISDS, EURACTIV
(Jan. 15, 2015, 1:04 AM), https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/france-and-
germany-to-form-united-front-against-isds/ [https://perma.cc/3GBA-YTRA]; Andrew Grice, TTIP:
Activists Triumph As Contentious US Free Trade Deal Clause Suspended, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 13,
2015, 7:02 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ttip-activists-triumph-as-
contentious-us-free-trade-deal-clause-suspended-9976090.html [https://perma.cc/548F-K6RF].
199. See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 2001/21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2001/21,
at 2 (Aug. 16, 2001) (noting "actual or potential conflicts" between human rights obligations and
TRIPS); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights (CESCR), Statement on the Work of Its Twenty-
Seventh Session: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C12/2001/15 (Dec 14, 2001) (noting that
IP rights "must be balanced with the right ... to enjoy the benefits of scientific rights"); U.N. Econ.
& Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Progress Rep. on Its Fifty-
Third Session, TT 20-24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001) (submitted by J. Oloka-
Onyango & Deepika Udagama) (noting that IP undermines human rights objectives); Rep. of High
Comm'r of Hum. Rts., TRIPS Impact, supra note 98, ¶ 28.
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unless proposals for a multilateral investment court come to fruition.200
However, setting arbitrator independence aside, increased public
awareness and criticism of ISDS generally may itself be helpful in
producing desirable results. In particular, tribunalists may be more
likely to adopt procedures to address criticisms of a lack of democratic
accountability. Similarly, perhaps tribunalists conscious of public
criticism may even embrace doctrines that provide more domestic
flexibility.
The initial ISDS cases involving IP suggest that tribunalists are
aware of criticism of ISDS generally, and perhaps take such criticism
into account with respect to procedural issues. 201 For example, in Philip
Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, the tribunal properly dismissed the
dispute after Philip Morris attempted to reincorporate to become a
"foreign" company under the Australia-Hong Kong Bilateral
Investment Agreement. 202  Although that may seem clearly
inappropriate, other tribunals have previously blessed such action. 203
However, this maneuver attracted a great deal of attention that
contributed to discussions of how then-pending agreements would bar
such action.204 Accordingly, the tribunal may have been sensitive to
200. If a multilateral investment court is a viable option, this could result in an overhaul
of rules concerning arbitrators in all disputes. Otherwise, it would be difficult to change the current
rules since existing arbitrators would likely strongly lobby against changing the status quo.
201. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 587-88 (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Philip Morris Asia Ltd.,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility], https://www.italaw.comlsites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7303.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9AQC-TFG2]. Accepting amicus briefs can be seen as part of a trend of tribunals reacting to
criticism of lack of transparency or democratic accountability. See Sophie Lamb, Recent
Developments in the Law and Practice of Amicus Briefs in Investor-State Arbitration, 5 INDIAN J.
ARB. L. 72, 87 (2017).
202. Philip Morris Asia Ltd., Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 201, T
588.
203. See JANE KELSEY & LORI WALLACH, "INVESTOR STATE" DISPUTES IN TRADE PACT
THREATEN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 3 (2012); Rachel Thorn &
Jennifer Doucleff, Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial of Benefits Clauses: Testing Treaty
Language and the Concept of "Investor," in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 3,
5 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International
Investment Protection, 9 EUR. BUs. ORG. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008) (noting extreme case in Tokios Tokeles
v. Ukraine in which Ukrainian investors incorporated in Lithuania and then used that to invest
back in Ukraine).
204. See, e.g., John Brinkley, What Doesn't Kill Philip Morris Seems to Make It Stronger,
FORBES (July 17, 2017, 1:07 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2017/07/17/what-
doesnt-kill-philip-morris-seems-to-make-it-stronger/#107e25ddbd57 [https://perma.cc/V4R4-
ZWPF]; Matthew Webb, Treaty Shopping: How Philip Morris Cherry-Picked Worst Case BITs,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Dec. 2, 2012), http://infojustice.org/archives/28044 [https://perma.cclXYC3-
5VF9] (suggesting that countries amend treaties to bar actions such as PMI). However, the strong
publicity associated with Philip Morris' bold move has led to new language in recent agreements
that aim to limit such action. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 52, art. 8.1; see also EUR. PARLIAMENT,
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES, THE INVESTMENT CHAPTERS OF THE EU's
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public sentiment. Also, the tribunals in Philip Morris v. Uruguay as
well as in Eli Lilly v. Canada both accepted third-party amici even
though there is no absolute right for parties to participate; 20 5 this is
consistent with a recent trend of tribunals accepting more amicus briefs
as one way to address criticism of lack of transparency and lack of
democratic accountability. 206 Notably, there were a large number of
amicus briefs filed in Eli Lilly v. Canada,207 and the tribunal accepted
all of them unless the briefs were barred by the narrow NAFTA
guidelines limiting participation to only citizens of NAFTA. 208
The Philip Morris v. Uruguay tribunal's analysis and rejection
of an expropriation claim suggests that heightened public attention
may result in a highly deferential approach to states. All of the
tribunalists in Philip Morris v. Uruguay embraced a deferential
approach to states in evaluating indirect expropriation; in particular,
they excluded from the scope of indirect expropriation any state actions
that were based on police power to protect public health so long as done
in a nondiscriminatory manner.209 The tribunalists included Gary
Born, who was chosen by Philip MorriS210 and is a supporter of
traditional ISDS, which tends to favor companies. 211 Based on a broad
reading of the Vienna Convention rules concerning customary
international law, all tribunalists concurred that bona fide exercise of
police powers on issues such as public health precludes compensation
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17 (2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.euRegDataletudes/STUD/2015/534998/EXPOSTU(2015)534998_E
N.pdf [https://perma.cclK7HE-N3JA] (explaining how CETA and other agreements aim to limit
forum shopping).
205. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order No.
4, at 3-4 (Feb. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Procedural Order No. 4],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7l45.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YNE-Z368]; Philip Morris Brand Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Procedural Order No. 3, TT 1-3 (Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Philip Morris,
Procedural Order], https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw416 1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SGK-F5QR].
206. See Lamb, supra note 201, at 87.
207. See LUKE ERIC PETERSON, AS UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER OF WOULD-BE AMICUS
CURIAE INTERVENE IN ELI LILLY V. CANADA NAFTA CASE ARBITRATORS FACE SEVERAL DILEMMAS,
INV. ARB. REPORTER (2016).
208. See Eli Lilly, Procedural Order No. 4, supra note 205, TT 2-4. The tribunal dismissed
Canada's claim that some of the amicus briefs should be rejected because they were from
organizations that Eli Lilly was a member of. See id. ¶¶ 2-3.
209. See Philip Morris, Award, supra note 5, ¶ 188.
210. See id. T 18 (noting that Philip Morris chose Gary Born).
211. See CECILIA OLIVET ET AL., WINNING THE DEBATE AGAINST PRO-ISDS VOICES: AN
ACTIVIST'S ARGUMENTATION GUIDE 7 (2017) (highlighting Born as a prominent defender of ISDS
who has dismissed criticisms as "surprisingly ill-informed"); Simon Lester, Gary Born Defending
Investment Arbitration, INT'L ECON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Aug. 8, 2016, 6:29 AM),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/08/gary-born-defending-isds.html
[https://perma.cc/JT8J-JMKV].
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even if it directly harms an investor, so long as it is nondiscriminatory
and proportionate. 212 This is remarkable not only because there are
earlier decisions that state otherwise, which this tribunal could have
followed, but also because this tribunal provided a robust discussion for
a broad police power.213 In particular, the tribunal provided a thorough
recitation of other investment disputes supporting an exception from
expropriation when state actions were designed to promote human
health, and even cited recent agreements with supportive language,
even though such language is not binding nor part of current customary
international law. 2 14 The tribunal nonetheless asserted that these
agreements "reflect the position under general international law."2 1 5
Similarly, the tribunal's 2-1 rejection of Philip Morris's FET
claim could have been strongly influenced by heightened public
attention and scrutiny of this case.216 Although such claims are often
interpreted quite broadly,217 the majority held that "[t]he responsibility
for public health measures rests with the government and investment
tribunals should pay great deference to governmental judgments of
national needs in matters such as the protection of public health." 218
212. Philip Morris, Award, supra note 5, TT 287, 305.
213. See id. T 305-07.
214. See id. ¶ 300 (citing 2004 and 2012 US Model BIT sections that contain exception
clauses against expropriation except in "rare circumstances" for nondiscriminatory regulatory
actions, as well as the 2004 and 2012 Canada Model BITs, and even the EU-Canada CETA
agreement).
215. Id. ¶ 301 (noting that even though the provisions could have been introduced out of
abundance of caution, they nonetheless "reflect the position under general international law").
216. See id. ¶ 391 (noting WHO and PAHO amicus briefs supporting Uruguay action);
Philip Morris us. Uruguay: Intellectual Property Debate in International Investment Arbitration,
BERKELY TECH L.J. BLOG (Nov. 7, 2014), http://btlj.org/2014/11/philip-morris-vs-uruguay-
intellectual- property-debate-in-international-investment-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/XCQ9-
GE68] (noting the case was closely watched by the international investment community, as well
as by policymakers); see also Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v.
Uruguay: Will Investor-State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing Up in Smoke?,
INV. TREATY NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-
will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in- smoke/
[https://perma.cc/8ZQH-XKZ4].
217. Bryan Mercurio Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in
International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 871, 894 (2012); see also LISE JOHNSON
& LISA SACHS, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., THE TPP's INVESTMENT CHAPTER:
ENTRENCHING, RATHER THAN REFORMING, A FLAWED SYSTEM 5 (2015),
http://ccsi.columbia.edulfiles/2015/11/TPP-entrenching-flaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GD5V-Y4FW]; Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and
Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 297, 298 (2005).
218. Philip Morris, Award, supra note 5, ¶ 399. Notably, the tribunal further held that:
[T]he present case concerns a legislative policy decision taken against the background
of a strong scientific consensus as to the lethal effects of tobacco. Substantial deference
is due in that regard to national authorities' decisions as to the measures which should
be taken to address an acknowledged and major public health problem. The fair and
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The majority also embraced the "margin of appreciation," a concept
from the European Convention on Human Rights that generally favors
domestic actions, even though its original context is not pursuant to
IIAs.219 Although one tribunalist disagreed, 220 perhaps public attention
at least helped garner a majority on this issue-even though the concept
has not been consistently adopted by prior tribunals.221
The Eli Lilly award shows some acknowledgment of domestic
discretion, but it is not necessarily protective of TRIPS flexibilities.
Although some commentators have selectively focused on a few parts of
the Award that contain some recognition that investor-state tribunals
should not serve as an appellate tier, the opinion overall still clearly
permits companies to challenge domestic decisions, including ones by
domestic courts. 222 After all, in the same sentence in which the tribunal
stated that it should not serve as an appellate tier, it also said that in
exceptional circumstances, in which there is clear evidence of egregious
and shocking conduct, a FET claim could exist. 223 This is actually
consistent with recent investment chapter language that purportedly
limits indirect expropriation claims that target domestic action taken
equitable treatment standard is not a justiciable standard of good government, and the
tribunal is not a court of appeal.
Id. ¶ 418.
219. Id. ¶ 398. Although Uruguay is not a party to this Convention, the tribunal
nonetheless referred to it over the objection of Philip Morris, to support granting discretion to
domestic regulatory agencies to address policy determinations, at least in the context of public
health. Id. ¶¶ 398-99.
220. See Philip Morris Brands Sarl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Concurrence and Dissent, TT 82-88 (July 8, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7428.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L9L-JUFC] [hereinafter Philip Morris, Concurrence
and Dissent] (concurrence and dissent by Born, Arb.) (rejecting the relevance of margin of
appreciation).
221. See Pezold v. Republic of Zimb., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award, July 28, 2015, T
465, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7095-O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PQ9R-2Z49] (rejecting margin of appreciation); MOUYAL, supra note 65, at 153-
54 (noting mixed reception to host claim reliance on the human rights concept of margin of
appreciation). See generally Philip Morris, Award, supra note 5.
222. See Richard Gold, Opinion, NAFTA Patent Ruling a Big Victory for Canadian
Innovation, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/rob-commentary/nafta-patent-ruling-a-big-victory-for-canadian-innovation/
article34617647/ [https://perma.cc/8SF5-EB6P] (asserting that Canada's successful defense "is
only the beginning" of an ability to shape its own innovation policy); Lipkus, supra note 3 (asserting
that Canada "no longer need[s] to worry that trade tribunals will become supranational courts of
appeal over domestic property law disputes").
223. Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 5, ¶ 224 ("[T]he Tribunal emphasizes that a NAFTA
Chapter Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier in respect of the decisions of the national
judiciary.").
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
on account of public health, yet leaves open the door to undefined "rare"
situations when this could still be an expropriation. 224
It is unclear why the Eli Lilly tribunal was less deferential than
the tribunal that ruled in favor of Uruguay, but it could be that there
was no state action clearly consistent with an international agreement
promoting the right to health.225 Another contributing factor could be
that restrictive NAFTA rules on third-party amici barred any
submissions from the WHO, which was permitted to submit an amicus
in Philip Morris v. Uruguay.226 However, there were amici who
explicitly raised concerns about TRIPS flexibilities, which are
nonetheless not at all mentioned in the award. 227 This is not entirely
surprising, since TRIPS flexibilities do not provide a direct defense to
any of the investment claims and Canada itself did not embrace
discussion of TRIPS flexibilities in its defense. 228
The Eli Lilly award may reflect some acknowledgement of the
importance of the dispute to domestic policy space on patents, yet in a
way that clearly permits future disputes. The tribunal could have
entirely rejected the challenge as improper based on actions by the
judiciary unless there was a denial of justice, as Canada argued, but it
declined to do so. 22 9 However, it was also not the worst-case scenario
for Canada. After all, the tribunal could have relied on some older
decisions to find for Eli Lilly based on the fact that the value of the
patents was now nullified. 230 Of course, if the tribunal relied on such
older decisions it would have been contrary to recent decisions
224. CPTPP, supra note 22, annex 9-B(3)(b); CETA, supra note 52, Annex 8-A(3); EUR.
COMM'N, COMMISSION DRAFT OF TEXT TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
(TTIP), annex I, T 3 (2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc
153807.pdf [https://perma.cc/V52M-HSLY].
225. In contrast, Uruguay was trying to implement the UN Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, which is expressly intended to promote public health. See Philip Morris, Award,
supra note 5, TT 79, 85, 95. Moreover, given the importance of such domestic laws to promote
public health, the investment disputes challenging tobacco limitations garnered substantial
publicity in comparison to Eli Lilly's dispute against Canada.
226. FREE TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT OF THE FREE TRADE COMMISSION ON NON-
DISPUTING PARTY PARTICIPATION § B(1) (Oct. 7, 2003),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf [https://perma.ccCFY2-ED4W] (limiting
tribunal discretion to accept submissions from a "person of a Party"); see also Eli Lilly, Procedural
Order No. 4, supra note 205, at 2 (interpreting this to exclude those who are not present in the
United States, Mexico, or Canada).
227. Eli Lilly, Brief of Dr. Burcu Kilic et al., supra note 20, at 2-3.
228. See generally Eli Lilly, Government of Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 111
(providing no mention of TRIPS flexibilitie s).
229. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 5, ¶¶ 186-90 (stating Canada's assertion that
there was no denial of justice due to Eli Lilly's admission, expropriation was impossible); id. TT
218-25 (tribunal stating that expropriation need not be limited to denial of justice, although
suggesting that only exceptional circumstances would result in expropriation).
230. See Ho, Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 265-66 (discussing the "sole effect doctrine").
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concerning expropriation that suggest the need to balance loss of
investment value against state interests.231 The tribunal did not
embrace this approach, which could be viewed as finding no significant
state interest in Canada's patent law. Rather, perhaps in an attempt
to avoid addressing whether significant state interests existed in a case
involving patents for drugs that were not essential, it framed the entire
decision on an evidentiary failure by Eli Lilly to establish that there
was a dramatic change in the law.2 3 2
There still remains a question of what to do in the near future
for subsequent companies that bring investor-state disputes
challenging IP norms. Advocates, including amici, can of course suggest
that tribunals consider and utilize balancing principles such as
proportionality, or even the margin of appreciation mentioned in Philip
Morris v. Uruguay.233 However, as the Eli Lilly award indicates,
tribunals may not feel any need to follow existing doctrine. What both
disputes show, nonetheless, is some sensitivity to public concern,
without entirely foreclosing future options for claimants. 234  For
example, even the majority's opinion in Philip Morris v. Uruguay
couched the ruling on the FET claim in terms of Uruguay's limited
financial abilities to do its own rigorous studies; this leaves open the
231. See SEBASTIAN L6PEz ESCARCENA, INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
10 (2014); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 148-49 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining that tribunals are also increasingly considering whether
legitimate expectations as an additional factor in evaluating expropriation); Ursula investors have
Kriebaum, Expropriation, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 38-41 (Marc
Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015) (noting that since the early 2000s, tribunals have shifted away from
the primary effect doctrine).
232. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 5, T 307 (noting that a fundamental question is
whether there was a dramatic change in Canada's utility requirement for Eli Lilly to prevail).
233. See Philip Morris, Award, supra note 5, T 399. Proportionality analysis should ensure
a more thoughtful balance of competing interests through its multiprong analysis of considering
(a) whether the state action serves a legitimate government purpose and is generally suited to
achieve this purpose (through some causal relationship); (b) whether the state action is "necessary"
in that there is no less restrictive measure that is equally effective; and (c) a balance between the
effects of the measure and the importance of the government purpose. See Benedict Kingsbury &
Stephen Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors'Rights with State Regulatory Actions in
the Public Interest-The Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW &
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 75, 86-87 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010). Some tribunals have previously
applied such analysis, albeit not in disputes involving IP. See, e.g., Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol.,
R.G. 2005/14005/A, Partial Award, ¶ 77, (Aug. 19, 2005) (reasonableness incorporated into fair and
equitable treatment standard); Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Rep., UNCITRAL, Partial
Award, ¶ 297 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0740.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8L6-HCU7]; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶113 (May 25, 2004); Pope v. Gov't of Canada, Interim Award,¶ 99 (June 26, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0674.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZFH6-9L9C] (reasonableness of administrative agency considered for FET
claim).
234. See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text (noting that public concern may have
influenced Uruguay award).
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possibility that tobacco companies could be successful in a challenge
against a developed country.235  In addition, although Canada
successfully defended against Eli Lilly's investment claims, the
tribunal's evidentiary framework did not provide any template for other
countries to easily defend against future investment claims. 236 To the
contrary, it may simply signal to companies the type of proof necessary
to win.
V. CONCLUSION
Although embracing human rights is not a complete panacea to
protecting domestic sovereignty-and especially limits on IP-from
investor-state disputes, it still reveals some useful insight at an
important time when such disputes are being revisited. In particular,
it helps reinforce the need to protect domestic discretion to limit IP at a
time when expansive IP rights-especially in the context of patents-
pose major budgetary problems for even developed countries.23 7 In
addition, although the initial investor-state disputes challenging IP are
concerning, this Article hopefully helps shed further light on the
problem as an important step towards better balancing investor rights
against domestic sovereignty and the general public, including
protecting their human rights.
235. Philip Morris, Award, supra note 5, ¶¶ 393-96 (noting Uruguay's "limited technical
and economic resources" as pertinent to finding Uruguay need not conduct additional studies).
236. That award notably did not actually analyze the individual investment claims and
instead focused on whether Eli Lilly had presented adequate evidence to prove its factual assertion
of a dramatic change in Canadian patent law, which was essential to prevailing on the investment
claims. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 5, TT 307-08. Accordingly, unless the identical arises
in other disputes, the tribunal decision provides no guidance. For a pro-state interpretation to
investment claims, see Ho, Sovereignty, supra note 16, at 283.
237. See, e.g., OXFAM, HIGH PRICED MEDICINES AND LACK OF NEEDS-DRIVEN INNOVATION:
A GLOBAL CRISIS THAT FUELS INEQUALITY 4 (2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/
files/file attachments/ib-high-priced-medicines-innovation-220917-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZZG-
X6EA].
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